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Farmworker equity-share schemes were initiated by the private sector in the Western
Cape region of South Africa in the early 1990's as a method of redistributing farm assets
to land reform beneficiaries while maintaining the viability of commercial farming
operations. This study set out to identify the institutional characteristics of successful
farmworker equity-share schemes in South Africa, and to discern a set of best
institutional practices that will likely promote the success offuture equity-share schemes.
. A detailed study of nine commercial farming ventures involving partnerships with
farmworkers was undertaken in the Western Cape during November 2001 to explore
relationships between their institutional arrangements, worker empowerment,
management quality and performance.
Farmworker equity-share schemes (FWES) have received both positive and negative
publicity. This thesis adds to the debate surrounding these land reform projects by
comparing the results ofcase studies conducted by the Surplus People's Project in 1998
with more recent (2001) case studies. The latter suggest that many of the concerns raised
by the Surplus People's Project, such as beneficiaries ' participation and expectations,
power relations between management and worker-shareholders, skills transfer and labour
relations, have been addressed. The dissertation also highlights those issues that remain
areas or concern, li.lr example, beneficiaries" tenure security, literacy levels amongst
worker shareholders, skill and wage differences between men and women, and exit
III
procedures.
A cluster analysis of variables measuring four constructs of a successful fannworker
equity-share scheme, VIZ. sound institutional arrangements, effective worker
empowerment, competent management and · good performance, revealed positive
relationships between these constructs. Best institutional practices identified by the
analysis suggest that fannworker equity-share schemes should be operated as (or like) a
company with voting and benefit rights proportional to individual shareholdings, but with
restrictions on certain share transactions to prevent free-riding by non-workers and the
loss of creditworthiness through sudden outflows of equity and managerial expertise.
However, this positive relationship between best institutional practices and enterprise
performance is dependent on effective worker empowerment (e.g. skills transfer and
gender representation), good governance (e.g. external auditing) and competent
management (e.g. schemes to reward worker performance and to resolve disputes).
From a policy perspective it is recommended that public land reform grants should be
awarded only to beneficiaries ofFWES that have been eo-financed by a bank or reputable
investor as this ensures a thorough financial assessment of the project, and only to
projects that can demonstrate a history of good labour relations. It is also recommended
that the Department of Land Affairs should consider extending its grants to regular but
seasonal farmworkers who wish to participate in an established project. While
fannworker equity-share schemes may not provide all of the answers to land reform they
IV
have an important role to play in redistributing wealth and de-racialising commercial
agriculture in South Africa.
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INTRODUCTION
South Africa has a history of grossly inequitable land ownership. This legacy was
formalized by the 1913 Natives Land Act, which restricted African land ownership to
tribal homelands. In the homelands, land was administered by tribal chiefs and farmed
under customary tenure. By 1991 the combined area of the homelands was 17.1 million
hectares (NDA, 2000: 5) or approximately 13.9 per cent of the national area. It was
estimated then that, 12.7 million people lived in the homelands (Baber, 1991: 54). To
promote political stability and economic growth in South Africa it is essential that
ownership patterns within commercial agriculture should change in a meaningful way
without undermining the sector's productivity in the long-run.
In 1994 South Afiica 's new democratic government developed the Reconstruction and
Development Program (RDP) to redress inequalities. The RDP emphasized land reform,
expecting it to improve both agricultural productivity and the welfare of poor
beneficiaries. The land reform policy aimed to encompass the three goals of land
restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution, with land redistribution as the main
tool of the land reform program (Turner and Ibsen, 2000: 9). Early results of this
programme were disappointing and fell far short of stated goals (Deininger et al., 1999:
12). For example, land restitution and land redistribution together transferred less than
1.2 per cent of the area available for redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal over the six year
period 1995-2000 (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). The slow pace of land reform has been
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attributed to two fundamental obstacles. First, it is not economically feasible to partition
large commercial farms into much smaller, affordable units in situations where many
resources are indivisible (e.g. packsheds, irrigation equipment and machinery) and the
costs of surveying, transferring and registering sub-divisions are high (Simms, 1997).
Second, prospective farmers lack capital and are unable to finance land with mortgage
loans from commercial banks due to cash flow problems caused by relatively high
inflation rates and low current returns to land (Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1995).
Faced with these problems, most of the disadvantaged people who have managed to
acquire farmland have done so by pooling their meagre resources and purchasing farms
collectively. More than half of the 94,160 hectares of commercial farmland acquired by
disadvantaged owners in KwaZulu-Natal during the period 1997-2000 is eo-owned (Lyne
and Darroch, 2001). This trend is of some concern when viewed against the chequered
history of cooperative farming models (Dorner and Kanel, 1977) . However, South Africa
has also seen the emergence of farmworker equity-share schemes (FWES) that might
offer a viable alternative to traditional forms of eo-ownership,
The objectives of this study are twofold: (a) to identify institutional and financial factors
that influence the success of farm worker equity-share schemes using relevant theory from
the body of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and data gathered from nine case studies
of existing joint ventures, and (b) based on the factors identified, to determine what set of
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best institutional practices is most likely to promote the success of these schemes I.
Between 1994 and 1999 the government offered a R15,000 (and later a RI6,000)
settlement/land acquisition grant (SLAG) to historically disadvantaged households who
wished to acquire land on the market. In 1997 the Department of Land Affairs (DLA)
allowed these grants to be used in the establishment of farmworker equity-share schemes
(Graham and Lyne, 1999). In these projects the grant beneficiaries are permanent farm
workers who purchase financial equity in, and hence part ownership and control of, the
farm on which they work. They and the farmer then become shareholders in a joint
enterprise, possibly with a third-party investor. Ideally , company management exercises
exclusive use rights to the farmland with farmworkers obtaining voting and benefit rights
(dividends and capital gains) in proportion to their equity investment. Mather and
Adelzadeh (1997: I I) describe farmworker equ ity-share schemes as "a method of
redistributing land without affecting the (operation) of individual farms or overall
production levels; indeed, with better job satisfaction and greater participation,
productivity should increase on farms where workers are also owners".
Growing doubts about the settlement\land acquisition grant programme saw a
moratorium imposed on new grant s in June 1999 and its eventual replacement by the
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme in August
2001. LRAD aims to contribute to the redistribution of 30 per cent of the country's
agricultural land over the next 15 years (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs , 2000:
I Owing to the small sample size, a cluster analysis of 35 variables (rather than nine cases) was conducted
to explore relationships between indicators of project performance, institutional arrangements, worker
empowerment and management quality.
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1). To qualify for LRAD's entry-level grant of R20,000 the applicant must contribute a
minimum of R5,000 in cash, kind or labour towards a sustainable farming enterprise. A
maximum grant of R 100,000 can be accessed if the beneficiary is able to contribute
R400,000 in savings and loan finance (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000:
4). Early drafts of the LRAD sub-programme excluded equity-share schemes and focused
on emerging farmers who would purchase and manage small farms of their own.
Although the grants have again been extended to FWES, He concept of land reform
through equity-sharing is still widely debated. Originally recommended by McKenzie
(1993), the first scheme was established in 1992, and its initial assessment was positive
(Eckert et al., 1996). However, a more recent study undertaken by the Surplus People's
Project argues that the schemes are simply a convenient way for commercial farmers to
leverage cheap capital, increase productivity and eliminate strike action (Fast, 1999: 1).
Due to delays in implementing LRAD, the government has made very little progress with
land redistribution since 1999. For example , in KwaZulu-Natal only 2,133 hectares of the
available land was purchased with grants in 2000 compared with 14,727 hectares in 1999
(Lyne and Darroch, 2001) . However, private transactions between white land owners and
disadvantaged buyers have continued to redistribute land at a faster rate without
government assistance (Lyne and Darroch, 2001).
LRAD represents an important shift in government policy away from group settlement
and towards individual owner operators. Nevertheless, this study is relevant because eo-
ownership will continue to pose a challenge in the transition of South Africa 's
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commercial and communal farming sector for three main reasons. First, many of the
group settlement schemes that were created under the government's settlement/land
acquisition grant programme have succumbed to weak institutions. The Department of
Land Affairs was not always able to ensure that diverse groups of beneficiaries would
devise and enforce rules to manage their communal resources. In the virtual absence of
rules governing use or benefit rights, some of this land has become an open access
resource with individuals unable or unwilling to finance improvements and inputs (Pitout
et al. , 1998: 47). The beneficiaries remain poor as their current returns to land are low
and they cannot realise the capital value of their land as it is no longer marketable. This
situation is unlikely to improve unless the institutional foundations of these jrojects are
redesigned. Similar conditions prevail in many of South Africa's former homelands
where high quality natural resources are poorly utilized because the communities who
share these resources face institutional and financial problems such as insecure land
tenure (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990) and lack of access to affordable credit (Kirstenet al.,
1996; Fenwick and Lyne, 1999).
Second, most land currently farmed by the state and its agents is contested by
neighbouring communities. The notion that this land should be subdivided and privatised
to individuals who benefit from LRAD grants has been strongly rejected by these
communities who perceive that all of their members should benefit from the land (Greene
and Lyne, 2001).
Third, large commercial farms are expected to remain a predominant feature of South
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African agriculture (owing largely to the reality of lumpy resources and fixed transaction
and subdivision costs) and it is therefore crucial that new ways are found to improve rural
livelihoods and access to land on commercial farms through new ownership structures.
Changing the ownership structure of commercial farms can redistribute wealth without
adversely affecting agricultural productivity, farmworker employment or sacrificing
economies of farm size (Eckert et al., 1996).
In all of these circumstances, equ ity-sharing may offer a useful way of dealing with free-
rider problems that tend to undermine the performance of cooperative and collective
enterprises built on shared resources. This research is particularly important for
KwaZulu-Natal where approximately 40 per cent of rural land is owned by the state
(KFC, 1995: 49). Some of this land is farmed commercially by government agents and
white tenants but most of it is occupi ed under customary forms of land tenure and is
characterized by poverty and under-investment despite a wealth of opportunities in
farming and eco-tourism enterprises. Equity-share projects may provide a way of creating
an institutional environment that will attract the expertise and investment needed to take
advantage of the opportunities that exist.
The thesis is presented as follows : Chapter I describes the sampling technique used to
select nine farmworker joint ventures for case study, and summarises key features of each
enterprise. Relevant literature is reviewed in Chapter 2 with discussion focusing on the
observed outcomes of collective ownership of farms in South Africa and the important
relationship between their institutional arrangements and performance. Chapter 3
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discusses recent perceptions of farmworker equity-share schemes and how these
perceptions have changed over a three-year period, and chapter 4 uses cluster analysis to
distil a set of "best institutional arrangements" for farmworker equity-share schemes. The
thesis ends with management and policy recommendations for land reform projects
involving eo-ownership of resources in South Africa.
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CHAPTER 1
SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE
FARMWORKER JOINT VENTURES STUDIED
In 1998 it was estimated that around 50 equity-share schemes had been initiated in South
Africa, mostly in the Western Cape wine and fruit producing areas (Lyne etal., 1998: 2)
where high land prices, lack of access to finance and markets, and lack of management
and business skills create barriers to the entry of new farmers (McKenzie, 1993). The
establishment ofequity-share schemes has provided an alternative form ofaccess to these
high-value agricultural enterprises. This chapter introduces nine farmworker joint
ventures studied in the Western Cape during November 2001. Data gathered from these
case studies are used later to explore relationships between their institutional
arrangements and their performance, management quality and empowerment.
1.1 Selection ofcase studies
The research for this project was undertaken November 2001 in the Lutzville, Elgin,
Paarl, Piketberg and Stellenbosch regions of the Western Cape. Nine established
farmworker joint ventures producing deciduous fruit, wine , citrus, olives and vegetables
were selected as case studies. The enterprises were selected to ensure variation across a
number ofknown indicators, such as use ofexternal finance, size and gender composition
of beneficiary group, relative shareholdings offarm workers , and choice of legal entities
and business organization. The sample was designed to control, where possible, for non-
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institutional determinants of financial performance such as enterprise type and
geographic region. However, actual financial performance was not known a priori, but
based on anecdotal evidence, efforts were made to select enterprises ranging from poorly
performing to the more successful. The final choice of projects was constrained mainly
by the fact that few of the 21 FWES identified in the Western Cape had been operating
for more than one year with their current set of institutional arrangements. In addition,
some managers were not available at the time of the study and, in two cases, the
managers refused to participate.
In-depth interviews were conducted with the manager (frequently, the previous farm
owner), worker trustees, external financiers, local officials from the Department of Land
Affairs, and the firms contracted to help with project planning, training and facilitation.
Interviews with the manager and worker trustees were conducted using a structured,
open-ended questionnaire (Appendix I) to examine institutional arrangements and their
impact on internal rules, practices, management, compliance, incentives, and access to
finance. Interviews with external financiers, local officials from the DLA and the firms
contracted to help with project planning, training and facilitation were less structured and
explored project-specific problems. Open-ended questionnaires are used when all
possible answers to a given question are unknown, when the number of possible
responses is very large or when it is important to get the respondent to think about the
answer to the question and not simply choose between a number ofpossibJe alternatives
(Martins et al., 1999: 229). According to Harling and Misser (2000), the presentation ofa
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case study requires creating a structure, describing the facts (in chronological order)
and reporting relevant dialogue.
1.2 Description ofcase studies
1.2.1 Bugler's Post
Bugler's Post is a fruit and flower (proteas) farm situated approximately 15 km from the
town ofPiketberg on the Piket Mountain, 150 km north of Cape Town. The farm was
converted into an equity-share project in mid-1998 and a new company was registered at
the beginning of2000. Forty-two beneficiary households, comprising 66 individuals (55
per cent are women), formed a workers' trust. The trust purchased a six per cent share in
the company with DLA settlementlland acquisition grants . The original farm owner holds
the remaining 94 per cent ofthe equity in the company. The company owns and manages
the fann. Figure 1 shows some ofthe worker-shareholders sorting proteas, and Figure 2 a
scene ofpear orchards on the farm.
Figure 1: Women sorting proteas at Bugler's Post
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The company earns approximately 20 per cent of its gross income (an estimated
RI,500,000 in 200 I) from local sales and 80 per cent from export sales. Currently only
40 per cent ofoutput is packed or processed on the farm but this will increase to 90 per
cent in the near future as a large pack shed has recently been built for this purpose.
Bugler's Post is expanding its production of proteas, a lucrative cash crop that provides a
buffer against dips in fruit prices. Proteas allow for the efficient use of poor soils and
assist in avoiding replant disease in apple and pear orchards.
The manager and worker trustees were vel)' enthusiastic about the project, and seemed
satisfied with progress made since the project commenced. A long-standing relationship
between members of the neighbouring community who have worked on the farm since
the lnce family first owned it has contributed to a high level of trust within the project.
The community is vel)' stable , and its people have a strong sense ofbelonging. There is a
general consensus amongst beneficiaries that the project must provide for their retirement
and should not be seen only as a mechanism to supplement their wage income.
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Figure 2: Pear orchards at Bugler's Post
1.2.2 Cape Olive
Cape Olive is made up of six farms located in the foothills ofthe Drakenstein mountain
range, approximately ten kilometres from the town ofPaarl. The business was established
by the Costa family, who have been farming olives in South Africa since 1925 and who
introduced olive farming to South Africa. The area is ideally suited to olives as it has
deep soil, low humidity and a warm climate. There are dramatic differences in altitude
between the various farms, enabling Cape Olive to grow up to 20 different cultivars of
olives. Cape Olive became an equity-share project in 1997.
Thirty-four beneficiaries (59 per cent are women) from 29 households formed a workers'
trust to represent their interests in the project. Beneficiaries' shares in the workers' trust
were funded with DLA settlement/land acquisition grants. The enterprise itself is also
registered as a trust, Cape Olive Trust, with two companies as its members - Cape Olive
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Holdings and Cape Olive Properties.
There are three shareholding groups, namely NewFarmers Development Company (79
per cent), the Costa family (17.5 per cent) and the workers ' trust (3.5 per cent). The
shareholder groups own the holding company. In turn, Cape Olive Holdings owns allof
the shares in the land-holding company, Cape Olive Properties. Cape Olive Trust
manages the farm under a sharecropping agreement with Cape Olive Properties.
Cape Olive earns an estimated 99.5 per cent of its gross income (RI 5,000,000 in 2001)
from olives and the remainder from grapes. All of this income is derived from local sales
but, in future, Cape Olive hopes to enter the export market under the trade name Buffet
Olives.
The motivation behind this project was to give the farmworkers at Cape Olive a financial
stake in the business, capacity to influence decision-making on the farm, and an
opportunity to acquire the business and financial management skills that they would need
to become entrepreneurs in the future. From the outset, the focus ofthis project has been
on social upliftrnent rather than shalt-term land reform. The manager is also interested in
trying to find a way of including casual workers in the project as many of them return to
their seasonal jobs every year.
Low levels ofliteracy posed a major challenge in facilitating the equity-share project. To
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start with, the problem ofalcohol abuse had to be dealt with. A system ofbreathalysing
each worker at random times ofthe day was introduced and persons found to have been
drinking alcohol were fired. A common language had to be adopted to explain the project
to workers in simple terms. Workshops were held to explain the provisions of the Basic
.. .
Conditions ofEmployment Act, Act 75 of1997. The farm then established its own labour
policy, defining rules ofconduct for management and workers.
In 1994 the workers financed a "Spaza" shop (Figure 3) with funds remaining from their
pooled settlement/land acquisition grants. The shop has reduced travel costs (to purchase
basic necessities) and earns a small monthly income for the workers' trust. The workers'
trust has also raised a loan from Cape Olive and, with expertise from the University of
Stellenbosch, has started a fish project (Figure 4). Both workers and management
attribute the success ofthis project to mutual trust and transparency.
Figure 3: Spaza shop at Cape Olive
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Figure 4: Workers' fish project with olive trees in the background
1.2.3 Erfdee1
Erfdeel is a table grape, citrus and wine grape farming enterprise situated 18 km north of
the town ofPiketberg and approximately 170 km north of Cape Town. Figures 5 and 6
offer the reader a view of this picturesque farm. The farm was converted into a
farmworker equity-share scheme in 1997. Compared with other projects studied, this
project took the shortest length oftime (seven months) to facilitate.
Worker beneficiaries include 24 households, comprising 36 individuals (39 per cent are
women), who have established a workers' trust. The workers' trust initially purchased a
six per cent share in the Erfdeel Farming Trust (EFT) with SLAG funding but this has
since increased to 20 per cent through a loan from Khula Enterprise Finance. There are
two other shareholders, namely NewFarmers Development Company with 60 per cent
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and the farm manager with 20 per cent.
The project was initiated by the farm manger who approached the farmworkers at Erfdeel
with a proposal that they become eo-owners of Erfdeel farm. NewFarmers agreed to
become a third party investor in the project. The landowner was approached with an offer
for the farm, which he accepted, and ownership transferred to the Erfdeel Farming Trust.
EFT therefore owns and controls Erfdeel Farm.
In addition to grapes and citrus, Erfdeel has potential for livestock and vegetable
production. The farm has a relatively low risk profile in that it was purchased as a
profitable concern, has a diversified enterprise mix, an experienced general manager and
competent worker-shareholders. EFT earns an estimated 60 per cent of its gross income
from wine and table grapes (31 hectares) and 40 per cent from citrus (35 hectares).
Almost 90 per cent of this gross income is earned from export sales. At the end ofthe last
financial year (2001), EFT had a gross income of approximately R3,500,000. The
ultimate aim ofthis project is to source a foreign investor and then to market the project's
output under an empowerment label on the overseas market.
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Figure 5: Erfdeel orchards with Piketberg mountain behind
Figure 6: Entrance to Erfdeel farmworker equity-share scheme
1.2.4 Fair Valley
Fair Valley is an 18 hectare farm between the towns ofStellenbosch and Paarl. This farm,
adjacent to Fairview Estate, came up for public auction in June 1997. The owner of
Fairview Estate contacted the Department of Land Affairs with a request for
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settlement/land acquisition grants for his employees to purchase and settle on Fair
Valley.
The original plan was for the beneficiaries to plant vines on their own land, make wine in
the Fairview Estate winery, and market the product under their own label, "Fair Valley".
While waiting for their vines to bear, the workers would buy in grapes from Fairview
Estate. This would allow them to establish their label and provide immediate cash flow
for their housing development.
After purchase in 1997, the land was found to be completely unsuitable for any form of
agriculture. Furthermore, the road adjoining Fair Valley was declared an agri-tourism
route, restricting further development of housing there (Figure 7). The local Council has
refused permission to sub-divide the land and no more (than the current eight) houses can
be built. The 52 workers involved in the project (54 per cent are women) are represented
by a communal property association (CPA). Most members are generally very
despondent about the lack of progress. The Council's decision is presently being
challenged in court. In the meantime the members ofthe CPA have continued to buy in
grapes from the cheapest source and to make wine in the Fairview Estate winery (Figure
8). All profits from this processing operation are being retained to finance new houses
once permission is granted to resume building. This farmworker joint venture is the only
one ofthe nine case studies that is not an equity-share scheme.
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Figure 7: Fair Valley housing project
Figure 8: Fair Valley wine being bottled at Fairview Estate
1.2.5 Iona
Iona (the Celtic word for "equality") is a farmworker equity-share scheme producing
apples, pears and wine grapes (Figure 9) on the farm Geelbeksvlei in the Elgin district,
20
approximately 150 km east of Cape Town. Efforts to convert the farm into an equity-
share project began in 1997 but delays in the payment ofgrants awarded under the SLAG
programme meant that workers were not issued with shares until 2000 when the grants
were received. A company owns and manages the farm.
The company purchased Geelbeksvlei farm in 1997 as a viable apple and pear enterprise.
In the same year apple prices fell sharply. In order to survive, the farm began to replace
some ofits deciduous fruit orchards with vineyards. This decision was vindicated in 200 I
when Iona's Sauvignon Blanc won two awards, namely, a first class listing from South
African Airways (SAA) and a Wine ofthe Month rating . The SAA panel comprises ofsix
local and six international judges, and is generally accepted as being South Africa's
premium wine award. The same wine was also one ofthree Sauvignon Blancs chosen for
South Africa's first six star hotel, The Western Cape at Arabella, in a blind tasting of top
Sauvignon Blancs.
Forty-eight worker beneficiaries (56 per cent are women), from 41 households,
established a workers' trust to represent their interests in the company. SLAG funds
received in 2000 enabled the workers ' trust to purchase a five per cent share in the
company. Ownership of the company is now split four ways with the original owner
holding 50 per cent of its shares, his wife five per cent, the workers' trust five per cent
and an offshore investor 40 per cent. The company earns an estimated 80 per cent of its
gross income (R3, I00 ,000 in 200 I) from apples and pears (40 hectares in total) and 20
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per cent from wine. Roughly 30 per cent ofgross income is earned from local sales and
70 per cent from export sales .
Due to the long delay in payment ofgrants, workers were initially very disillusioned with
the project. There is strong consensus amongst the company's directors that "the
government is not interested in land reform, as they drag their heels all the way".
Figure 9: Chairman of the workers' trust (senior spray supervisor) spraying the
vineyard at Iona
1.2.6 Kleinbegin
Kleinbegin ("small beginnings") IS a deciduous fruit and citrus farm situated
approximately 24 km from the town ofPiketberg on the Piket Mountain, 150 km north of
Cape Town. The farm was converted into an equity-share project in 2001 .
22
A neighbouring tenant fanner purchased Kleinbegin in 1999 on a public auction when
it was declared insolvent. The decision to purchase the land was taken in consultation
with the tenant's employees and those of Kleinbegin who were willing to apply for
settlement/land acquisition grants and to enter ajoint venture as equity partners. The farm
was paid for by the tenant who raised a personal mortgage loan against the property
Kleinbegin. Unfortunately, the SLAG programme was suspended shortly afterwards and
the farm was operated as a sole proprietorship for the next two years.
Seventy workers (54 per cent are female) accessed the DLA's new Land Redistribution
for Agricultural Development grants and a loan from Khula Enterprise Finance in 200 I.
This enabled the workers' trust to purchase a 49 per cent share in a land-holding
company and a 49 per cent share in an operating partnership. This organisational
arrangement was chosen primarily for its tax advantage. The original owner can offset
expenditure in this project against income from his leased farm, Achtervlei. The
operating partnership has a long-term lease agreement with the land-holding company.
Cash remaining from the LRAD grants after purchasing the workers' shares was loaned
to the operating partnership. Interest earned from the loan will be paid in the form at least
two new houses constructed for beneficiaries each year. Due to the difficulties in
obtaining permission to sub-divide agricultural land, the beneficiaries will sign 99-year
lease agreements for their houses. These contracts will be registered against Kleinbegin's
title deed to provide tenure security.
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Approximately 80 per cent ofthe project's gross income (R850,000 in 2001) is earned
from stone and pome fruit (16 hectares), and 20 per cent is earned from citrus (12
hectares). Ofthis gross income, 70 per cent comes from local sales and the remaining 30
per cent from export sales.
The decision to eo-own Kleinbegin was a logical consequence ofa human development
project initiated on Achtervlei in 1981. The programme began by targeting alcohol abuse
and domestic violence. All employees have received training in life skills, including
domestic financial management, farm management and technical skills. Productivity on
Achtervlei increased substantially and eo-ownership ofKleinbegin was seen as a way of
redeploying surplus labour capacity at Achtervlei. Figure 10 pictures the worker trustees
posing in front ofan established orchard.
Figure 10: Kleinbegin trustees (foreground) and orchard (background)
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1.2.7 Lu Tour
Lu Tour is a vegetable and wine grape farm situated near Lutzville, approximately 350
km north of Cape Town. It was established on virgin land in 1998 and involved the
building of an 80 hectare irrigation dam on the Olifants River. The enterprise was
converted into a farmworker equity-share scheme in 2000.
There are 27 worker-shareholders (33 per cent are female) who also work on
neighbouring farms that belong to two commercial farmers involved in the project. The
workers are represented by a workers ' trust. The trust applied for LRAD grants on behalf
of the workers but their application had not been assessed at the time of study. In the
meantime the trustees raised a loan from the South African Wine Industry Trust
(SAWIT) to help finance a 40 per cent share in Lu Tour. The loan is to be re-paid when
the grant is awarded . The workers' share was co-fmanced with a subsidy paid by the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to construct the irrigation dam. The farm is
now owned and managed by a company that has three shareholders - the workers ' trust
with 40 per cent, a third-party investor with ten per cent and two commercial farmers
with a combined share of50 per cent.
Current cash needs are being met from short-term vegetable crops but the company has
also established 300 hectares of noble wine cultivars for future income. Should quality
expectations be realised (surveys indicate that the site is matched only by Groot
Constania for its grape ripening conditions) the company will endeavour to build its own
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wine cellar. In 2001 Lu Tour earned all of its gross income (R2,500,000) from local
sales of vegetable crops. Unfortunately, the enterprise has been adversely affected by a
downturn in the local economy where its bulky and perishable products (Figure 11) are
sold.
Figure 11: Newly planted tomato plants at Lu Tour with irrigation dam in background
1.2.8 Nuutbegin
Nuutbegin ("new beginnings") or Helderberg Vineyards as it is also known, is a 28
hectare fann planted to wine grapes and situated in the Devon Valley near Stellenbosch.
The land is owned by the Stellenbosch Municipality and leased by the owners and
workers oftwo neighbouring farms, Waterkloofand Fransmanskraal.
Nuutbegin was converted into a farmworker equity-share scheme in 2001 and is fanned
as an operating partnership between two parties, namely the owners (who are also
brothers) of the two neighbouring farms Waterkloof and Fransmanskraal, and a trust
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representing the interests of 72 workers who live on these two farms. Each partner
holds a 50 per cent share in the enterprise. This legal arrangement is the most tax efficient
for the brothers who can offset income earned on their own farms against expenditure on
the equity-share project. The workers' trust financed their 50 per cent share in the
partnership with LRAD grants received in 2001.
Nuutbegin is in a unique position. The operating partnership has secured a 50-year lease
(43 years remain) on the 28 hectares of land from the Stellenbosch municipality at a
nominal rental ofR16,000 per year. It is purely because ofthis inexpensive lease that the
project is expected to generate substantial profits after just three years ofoperation. If the
land had to be purchased or rented at market rates the project would be illiquid. The
average lifespan of a vineyard is 25 years and with 43 years remaining on the lease,
virtually two full rotations should be harvested. Stellenbosch Vineyards indicated that
they would buy the entire grape harvest which is likely to fetch a higher than expected
price per ton due to the demand for "empowerment wine". After further negotiations,
Stellenbosch Vineyards also agreed to provide processing facilities for the grapes. In
order to establish a long-term alliance , it was decided that the processing facility would
be secured through an investment in Stellenbosch Vineyards. This company will issue
debentures to the workers' trust, bearing interest at ten per cent per annum , that can be
converted into equity after a period often years. The balance of the LRAD grant, i.e. that
part not used to fmance equity in the partnership, will be invested in this way. Through
this arrangement, the project will not only acquire guaranteed access to a winery, but will
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also generate immediate cash income for the workers' trust (approximately RI ,000 per
individual per year).
According to the owner ofFransmanskraal the motivation for the project lay in the long-
standing relationship between the brothers and their workers, many of whom are fifth
generation employees. The owners of Waterkloof and Fransmanskraal wanted to give
their workers an opportunity to increase their incomes through higher productivity rates.
The partners are very enthusiastic about their joint venture. The brothers are financially
sound and experienced farmers. One of them is a prominent personality in the wine
industry and serves on numerous boards ofdirectors. Their participation in this project is
likely to have a powerful demonstration effect in the wine industry. Further, Nuutbegin
demonstrates that access to economic opportunities in agriculture does not require
ownership of land, but rather secure rights to benefit from expert management of land.
Figure 12 shows a trustee posing in a recently established vineyard.




Thandi (also known as the Lebanon Fruit Fanners Trust) is situated in the Elgin Valley,
approximately 60 km east of Cape Town. The project came about in 1995 when the
owner ofa commercial farm, de Rust Estate , and the State forestry company, SAFCOL,
together donated 180 hectares ofland to establish a joint venture with farmworkers and a
neighbouring community. The name of the project, Thandi, means "with love we grow
together" .
Shares held by the black community in the venture were distinguished from those held by
workers to represent the different interests ofcommunity members (all families living in
the SAFCOL village) and people employed by the project. The workers are all members
ofthe community, but not all community members work on Thandi. Hence there are four
shareholders in Thandi - SAFCOL (33.3 per cent), de Rust Estate (16.6 per cent) , the
community trust (33.3 per cent) and the workers ' trust (16.6 per cent). Twelve worker-
shareholders make up the workers ' trust. The community trust has 148 members ,
including the worker-shareholders.
Thandi grows 32 hectares ofapples , pears and plums and 14 hectares of wine grapes. At
present the project earns an estimated 90 per cent of its gross income (Rl ,200,000 in
2001) from apples , pears and plums and ten per cent from buying in grapes and
processing wine (this will continue until Thandi's own grapes come into production). The
wine, "Thandi", is sold as an empowerment wine and receives a premium price in certain
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overseas markets. Figure 13 shows members of the workers' trust offering their wine
for tasting.
A proposal has been initiated to extend the "Thandi" brand to other empowerment
projects. This will benefit other projects because the Thandi brand has received wide
recognition in the United Kingdom and commands significant shelfspace and premiums.
Thandi stands to benefit as it lacks the volume needed to satisfy its niche market.
Opening the brand to other empowerment projects will satisfy the orders of large
retailers, allow for placement at niche retailers, and offer consumers a larger selection of
empowerment products. Thandi was originally registered as a trust but is now being
restructured as a company.
Figure 13:Members ofthe Thandi workers' trust, offering wine for tasting
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1.3.1 Summary of key features characterising the fannworker equity-share schemes
studied
Table 1 compares key features ofthe eight farmworker equity-share schemes included as
case studies and shows that these land reform projects redistributed net farm assets
amounting to almost seven million Rand when measured in constant 2001 prices. This
largely reflects the aggregate value of settlement/land acquisition grants awarded to
participating workers. At three of the projects, the size of these grants (R15,000 to
R16,000 per beneficiary household) effectively limited the beneficiaries' joint
shareholding to a very small portion (3.5-6.0 per cent) of total equity. Under the new
LRAD sub-programme, each beneficiary will qualify for a minimum grant of R20,000
and - according to DLA officials in the Western Cape - beneficiaries will be able to
leverage larger grants (up to a maximum of RI 00,000 each) depending upon their own
contributions. Although SLAG beneficiaries are eligible for LRAD grants, priority will
be given to first time applicants (Middleton, 2001). Levels of worker empowerment are
therefore expected to improve on new FWES, and possibly on existing projects. Six of
the eight FWES in the 2001 study had firm plans to transfer more shares to worker-
shareholders over time.
Chapter 2 presents a discussion on the various tenure and institutional arrangements that
may exist when land is purchased by a group of eo-owners. Discussion focuses on the
economic outcomes postulated for each mode of"ownership".
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE SHARED RESOURCES:
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The purchase of land by a group of eo-owners can yield various tenure and institutional
.
arrangements, each of which has its own economic implications (Lyne and Graham,
2001). First, the group may divide the land into separate pieces with each individual
exercising exclusive rights over his or her own piece of land. Second, the group may
share the land with each member having inclusive use rights, often to grazing land. Third,
the group may decide to become non-users and surrender their use rights in favour of
benefit rights , such as a share in the profits , and hire a management team to operate the
farm. It is also possible that a number of these strategies may be used together, or that
rules governing use or benefit rights are missing or not enforced in which case the land
becomes an open access resource. The chapter provides an overview of the different
tenure and institutional arrangements that may arise when land is eo-owned by a group of
individuals, including the observed outcomes of land reform projects in South Africa.
The discussion highlights the institutional arrangements that should - according to New
Institutional Economics - be in place to encourage the success of an equity-share scheme.
2.1 Tenure arrangements on shared land
2.1.1 Open access
Open access to a resource means that users have unrestricted rights to use the resource . It
may occur on any land (state, private or communal ) where exclusive rights are not
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enforced. Gordon (1954) explained that when access to a resource is unrestricted,the
equilibrium use rate occurs when rents are zero. This implies over-utilization of the
resource in the economic sense. Individuals have no incentive to reduce their use of the
resource as the benefits (positive rents) would accrue to other users (free-riders).
In the absence of exclusive property rights, individuals have little incentive to invest as
others can free-ride. Open access also results in aIlocative inefficiency because land is
unlikely to transfer from less efficient to more efficient users as the cost to a potential
buyer or lessor of negotiating and transacting with an infinite number of users is
prohibitive (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1990). The absence of a sale market further
discourages investment because capital gains cannot be realised.
2.1.2 Common property
Common property may be defined as eo-ownership ofa resource by a well-defined group
of individuals who establish and enforce rules to limit the rate at which the resource is
exploited (Bromely and Cemea, 1989). Two basic types ofcommon property institutions
exist, user groups and non-user groups (Wynne, 1995: 12). Individual members ofa user
group make their own management decisions within the boundaries established by the
group as a whole. For example, the group may agree to limit the number of cattle that
each member can graze on commonage, but individuals manage their own herds. On the
other hand, members of a non-user group surrender their use-rights to a management
team in exchange for rights to share in the benefits flowing from the enterprise.
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In the case of a user group, rents from common property are positive but allocative
efficiency is not guaranteed as rights are unlikely to transfer to more efficient users
outside the group owing to high transactions costs (Lyne , 1995). Likewise, investment is
likely to be constrained because rules encouraging collective investment, e.g., the sharing
of benefits in proportion to individual contributions, are difficult to negotiate and apply.
This holds even when the user group is relatively small as some members may have less
incentive or ability to contribute (Kille and Lyne , 1993). When rules restricting the use
of the resource are not properly enforced with selective punishments or inducements the
result may be a shift from common property to open access with its associated
disadvantages. In the case of a non-user group , the economic outcomes could
approximate those expected under private ownership (section 2.1 .3) depending on how
the non-user group operates (section 2.2).
2.1.1 Land owned privately by corporate entities
Under private property, where fully exclusive and transferable rights are assigned to
individual owners, allocative efficiency is likely for two reasons . First, land markets tend
to operate efficiently because transactions costs are relatively low (Kille and Lyne, 1993).
Second, land transfers to the most effective users as the market imposes an opportunity
cost (in the form offoregone sale or rental income) on the owner for under-utilization of
the land (Nieuwoudt, 1990). If the owner is unable to use the land he or she has an
incentive to sell or lease the land to someone who can use it, resulting in a more efficient
allocation ofland.
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Individual owner-operators also have strong incentives to maintain and improve the
resource because the benefits of these investments can be fully internalised through
higher profits and capital gains can be realised at any time by selling the land . In addition,
owners ofmarketable land are better able to finance investments as the land has collateral
value to lenders (Nieuwoudt, 1990; Pasour, 1990: 187).
However, the economic outcomes are less predictable when land is privately owned by a
corporate entity. In South Africa, most commercial farmland is owned by corporate
entities registered as companies, trusts, close corporations, cooperatives, community land
trusts (CLT's) and communal property associations (CPA's). The incentives that guide
decisions taken by an organisation's members and managers are shaped by its
constitution and rules ofoperation. Ideally, these institutions should sustain the profitable
use of resources by encouraging investment, allocative efficiency and fairness in the
distribution of benefits. Public and private companies are usually subject to stringent
legal provisions that attempt to entrench good governance, i.e., institutions that promote
these desirable outcomes. For other types of corporate entity the legal provisions are
often less restrictive giving them more freedom to devise their own institutional rules.
Variations in the legal provisions governing different types of corporate entities
(companies, cooperatives, trusts, CPA's etc .) tend to result in broad differences between
their property rights and hence in their financial performance. Traditional cooperatives,
for example, tend to have a less successful record than companies (Porter and Scully,
J987). In South Africa, trusts are relatively free to devise their own institutional rules;
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some operate like companies, others like traditional cooperatives.
2.2 A conceptual model of institutional arrangements for a successful equity-share
scheme
A fannworker equity-share scheme (FWES) is a corporate farming entity that may, or
may not, embrace the institutional arrangements needed to facilitate the profitable use of
resources. The goals of a successful FWES have been variously stated as the
redistribution of wealth and future benefit streams (LCRF, 2001:8; Eckert et aI, 1996;
Kirsten et al., 1996); empowerment of farmworkers through skills transfer and their
formal inclusion in policy making (Eckert et al., 1996; McKenzie, 1993: 52; DLA,
undated: 20); retaining or attracting quality management (McKenzie, 1993: 52; Lyne et
al., 1998: 6); sourcing capital from the private sector to finance new investment, i.e.
preserving or enhancing creditworthiness (Lyne et al., 1998: 8; Kirsten et al., 1996;
Pitout et al., 1998: 66); the improvement of worker productivity and labour relations
(Lyne et aI. , 1998: 8; Van Rooyen and Ngqangweni, 1996: 4; Eckert et al., 1996); and
provision for the transfer of both ownership and control of commercial farms to
previously disadvantaged workers in the long-term (McKenzie, 1993: 52).
Achieving these goals requires a mix of institutional arrangements that make for good
corporate governance. To begin with, joint fanning ventures require decisive and
accountable management for financial performance (Nieuwoudt, 1990). Accountability
requires incentives for complying with rules, and penalties for breaking rules (LRCF,
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2001: 8). For decision-makers (directors, trustees and managers), accountability is
facilitated by transparency (e.g. in reporting audited financial statements) but is
ultimately ensured by the mobility of capital and a sound electoral process. When
combined with performance-based remuneration packages, the threat of disinvestment
(exit) and sanction (voice) by members encourages managers to maximize their benefits.
In addition, these institutions should eliminate or reduce the potential for free-riding to
encourage eo-owners to finance improvements and to use their shared resources in a
sustainable manner. Recent NIB literature analysing the demise of traditional
cooperatives in favour of"new generation" cooperatives (Cook and IIiopoulos, 1999 and
2000; Porter and Scully, 1987) and investor-owned firms (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001)
explains the relative inefficiency of traditional cooperatives in terms of inadequate
property rights that result in free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control and influence problems.
To solve the internal free-rider problem, property rights (i.e. benefit and voting rights)
assigned to members should be well defined and proportional to their individual capital
contribution.
The free-rider problem discourages member investment because some of the gains from
the cooperative accrue to individuals that did not fully invest in developing the gains.
These free riders could be non-members who patronize an open cooperative, or newier)
members who acquire the same rights as initial investors without paying the appreciated
(i.e. market) price for their shares. Thus it is important that workers ' interests in an
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equity-share scheme are not diluted by a transfer ofshares to non-workers as a result of
bequests or sales to outsiders. This would weaken worker incentives to increase their
work effort (Le. the employment contract would be less incentive compatible) and helps
to explain why the workers in most FWES insist that only employees may be
shareholders .
The horizon problem results from residual claims that do not extend as far as the
economic life of the underlying asset (Porter and Scully , 1987). Under these conditions,
cooperative members tend to under-invest in long-term and intangible assets (such as
vineyards, orchards, product promotion and brand loyalty) because they are prevented
from realizing capital gains by retiring shares at their market value. Again, new members
become free riders as they benefit from past investments without paying fully for them in
the form of higher share prices.
The portfolio problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) discourages members of a
cooperative from investing as much as they would do as shareholders in an investor-
owned firm (lOF). This problem arises because the cooperative's investment portfolio
may not reflect the interests or risk attitudes ofany given member. Members cannot trade
shares at market prices and are therefore unable to diversify or concentrate their own
asset portfolios to fully reflect personal risk preferences. This forced-rider problem is
. compounded by the cooperative principle ofequal voting power as the portfolio preferred
by those members who are willing to risk larger investments in the cooperative is likely
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to differ from that preferred by a risk-averse majority.
The control problem (Sykuta and Cook, 2001) refers to the cost that members face in
monitoring managers to ensure that they make prudent investment decisions and do not
shirk or cheat. Although this principal-agent problem is not unique to egalitarian
institutions like traditional cooperatives, it is less severe in IOFs where (a) larger
investors are able to internalise the dividends of their policing effort (because dividends
are proportional to investment), (b) agent performance is clearly signalled by the
market/audited value of members' equity shares, and (c) the agents are shareholders
themselves and therefore have incentive-compliant employment contracts (porter and
Scully, 1987).
Hendrikse and Veerman (200 I) cite cases ofleading marketing cooperatives in Ireland
and The Netherlands changing their governance structure in the direction of IOFs by
issuing some form of equity with proportional benefit and voting rights, or by outright
conversion to company status. Likewise, Cook and I1iopoulos (1999) describe the gradual
decline of traditional marketing cooperatives in the USA, and the recent birth and
proliferation ofnew generation cooperatives in response to inherent flaws in the structure
of property rights within traditional cooperatives. Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) further
contend that traditional cooperatives are at a disadvantage relative to IOFs when seeking
capital from external sources to finance assets that have specific uses. Specific assets
increase the financier's exposure to risk, and external financiers can do little to reduce
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this exposure when transacting with traditional cooperatives because managerial
decisions can be influenced by many small investors who have equal or near equal voting
rights. This "influence problem" tends to raise the cost ofexternal equity and debt capital
to finance assets that have specific uses. For this reason, a switch from cooperative to
IOF status is predictable when product markets become more differentiated.
These institutional problems can be avoided if the FWES is organized as an investor-
owned firm such as a company, or a trust or partnership that adopts and implements a
company-like constitution. Figure 14 presents a conceptual model linking the institutional
arrangements ofa farmworker equity-share scheme to its performance. The left-hand side
of the figure identifies strategic points of policy and programme interventions that
impinge directly or indirectly on the enterprise. The macroeconomic environment,
influenced by domestic policy and global trade, will have an important bearing on the
profitability of the enterprise regardless of its institutional and organizational features. A
conducive macro-policy environment will aid the performance ofeven a badly designed
enterprise, while a poor environment (currently the deciduous fruit sector, for example)
will constrain the performance ofa well-designed project.
Even the best institutional arrangements risk falling short of implementation without
investment in human capital that enables management and workers to take advantage of
their new rights and asset ownership. This is particularly so in situations where land
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Figure 14: Conceptual model offactors contributing to the performance ofa farmworker
equity-share scheme
commercial operations, and require new skills to administer their institutions, develop
business plans, interpret financial statements, participate in management decisions, and to
42
access input, product and financial markets. A favourable institutional environment
combined with an enabled management and workforce, ceteris paribus, should improve
the operating efficiency of the enterprise, thereby increasing demand for, and the
profitability of, fixed improvements and complementary inputs. In most commercial
farming situations, performance also depends on access to loan finance from banks that
evaluate applicants according to their institutional features, quality of management, net
worth and debt-servicing capacity.
2.3 Observed outcomes ofland reform projects in South Africa
2.3.1 Community land trusts and communal property associations
From 1994 to 1999 the government offered a R15,000 (and later a RI6,000) grant to
historically disadvantaged households who wished to acquire land on the market.
Commercial farms available generally cost at least 20 times the value ofthe grant (Turner
and Ibsen, 2000: 10). Groups of beneficiaries therefore pooled their grants and purchased
land collectively. The group established a legal entity , usually a community land trust
(CLT) or a communal property association (CPA), which became the owner of the
property. It was intended that the land would be utilized as a common property resource
with a well-defined group of beneficiaries who would enforce their own rules regulating
individual access to the land (Pitout et aI. , 1998: 10).
In KwaZulu-Natal, farms acquired by groups were usually separated into three parts: a
residential village, arable land with plots allocated to individuals, and an area set aside for
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communal grazing (Lyne and Graham, 2001). Case studies conducted on some of the
Cl.T's highlighted the presence of institutional problems that have undermined tenure
security and investment on these projects (Homby, 1996: 56; Pitout et al., 1998: 29-53).
Groups were too large (up to 500 households) to negotiate and enforce rules ofaccess to
farmland. Beneficiaries have taken a long time to move onto the land after taking
ownership due to the costs involved in moving their homes. Existing infrastructure is
often vandalized and destroyed while the farm lies unoccupied. Grazing land on most
projects is utilized as an open access resource as management committees are reluctant to
penalize individuals who ignore limits on herd size (Hornby, 1996: 56). Stocking rates
are sometimes double the level advised by the Department of Agriculture.
Members do not have exclusive rights to their arable land through the winter months.
This lack of fully exclusive land rights constrains the market for crop land. Individual
members are often unable to lease their arable land out due to opposition from other
members in the group who fecI that a potential lessor will benefit unfairly from grazing
his or her cattle on the maize stover produced by other households. Thus alIocative
efficiency is constrained (Pitout et al., 1998: 49).
In effect, the farms purchased by SLAG beneficiaries are no longer marketable and
therefore have no collateral value to lenders who perceive that they have little chance of
repossessing the land and selling it on the open market if the borrower defaults.
Beneficiaries therefore lack access to credit and thus their ability to invest is reduced.
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Inadequate support of these beneficiary groups following transfer of the land has
produced weak institutions on many grant-funded projects. Pitout et al. (1998: 29-53)
reported findings from case studies of selected CLT's showing poor accountability of
executive members , collapse of the electoral process and non-compliance with
managerial decisions. In an effort to address these problems, government introduced the
Communal Property Associations Act, 28 of 1996 (pitout et al., 1998: 10). The Act
specifies a set of five principles - fairness, equality , democracy, accountability and
transparency - that must be observed by beneficiaries when adopting a constitution. The
principles ofequality and democracy create potential for free-rider, portfolio, control and
influence problems that undermine investment. Although the Act is a positive step
towards overcoming institutional failure, it does not ensure institutional success because
CPA's, like CLT's, do not satisfy the fundamental requirements of rent maximization,
allocative efficiency and strong incentives to conserve and improve resources. It is
perhaps for these reasons that government policy has shifted in favour of identifying
creditworthy emerging farmers as beneficiaries of larger grants and settling them as
owner-operators on farms of their own (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000:
6). Table 2 compares the institutional characteristics of four types of corporate entity,
highlighting the pos itive aspects of equity-share companies and the possible features of
CPA's, Cl.T's and cooperatives that may hinder good governance.
Chapter 3 presents perceptions of FWES observed in the 200 I case studies. An earlier
study conducted by the Surplus People's Project reported largely negative views oflocal
45
FWES, but there was little support for these findin gs in the 2001 case studies.
Table 2: Important institutional characteristics ofequity-share companies,
communal property associations, community land trusts and cooperatives
Characteristic Equity-share Cooperative CLT CPA
Company
Net asset Shareholders Shareholders Members Members
ownership




Decisive Likely Likely Possible Possible
management
Transparency & Yes Yes No No
accountability
assured in law




Voting rights Yes No No No
proportional to
investment
Property rights Yes No No No
transferable at
market value
AlIocative Yes Possible Unlikely Unlikely
efficiency
Fragmentation Possible Possible I.ike ly over Likely over
of interests time time
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CHAPTER 3
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF FARMWORKER EQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES
Originally recommended by McKenzie (1993), the first farmworker equity-share scheme
was established in 1992 and its initial assessment was positive (Eckert et al., 1996).
However, a later study undertaken by the Surplus People 's Project argues that the
schemes are simply a convenient way for commercial farmers to leverage cheap capital ,
increase productivity and eliminate strike action (Fast, 1999: I). This chapter extends
these earlier studies, paying particular attention to their opposing views and the extent to
which concerns raised by the Surplus People 's Project may have been addressed in more
recent equity-share schemes.
In 1998 the Surplus Peoples' Project (SPP) - whose mission is "to promote the rights and
interests ofthe economically andpolitically marginalised in South Africa " - conducted a
study offour farmworker equity-share schemes, namely Hoogland Chickens, Ebukhosini,
Whitehall and Warmwater, situated in the Western Cape and Mpumalanga provinces.
The study attempted to find out if there was a difference between the "advantages" of
equity-share schemes as perceived by outsiders compared to how they were perceived by
the farmworkers. The SPP report (Fast, 1999: 1-46i was surprisingly negative given the
positive outcomes expected from the improved incentives that farmworker equity-share
2 All references to the 1999 SPP report that fo llow are attributed to this author
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schemes offer to fannworker participants, although it should be noted that one ofthese
projects was deliberately selected because it was experiencing financial problems.
. Most ofthe concern voiced against farmworker equity-share schemes can be attributed to
the Surplus People's Project. Their report (Fast, 1999: 1-46) focussed on nine major
concerns; worker participation during the establishment of the scheme, beneficiaries'
expectations, power relations between the worker-shareholders and the manager/original
owner, the transfer of skills, labour relations , the position of non-beneficiaries on the
farm (especially seasonal and casual workers) , gender relations, tenure security and
issues surrounding entry to and exit from a project. The case studies conducted in
November 2001 (hereafter referred to as the 200J study ) suggest that many of the
concerns raised by the SPP have been addressed (although some do remain valid) and
that many oftheir recommendations have been successfully implemented.
In July 1999 the Minister for Agricultural and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, imposed a
moratorium on new settlement/land acquisition grant projects whilst the land grant
programme was being redesigned . In February 2000 the moratorium was lifted when the
Minister issued a policy statement on the new directions she had decided to follow (OLA,
2000: 3). In this policy statement she stated that "all equity schemes will be reviewed"
(DLA, 2000: 5). It is possible that the SPP report may have been one of the reasons why
farmworker equity-share schemes were initially excluded from the LRAO sub-
programme.
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The analysis of perceptions presented in this chapter is qualitative rather than
quantitative, and relates only to the eight equity-share schemes studied. Questionnaires
used in the case studies often required respondents to rate their perception ofa particular
issue using a Likert-type scale with scores ranging from one to five (1=excellent;
2=good; 3=average, with room for improvement; 4=poor; 5=extremely poor). Trustees
were requested to respond as representatives of the worker-shareholder group rather than
providing their personal views. Only one consensus answer was recorded regardless of
the number of trustees interviewed (up to four) at each project. In the text, the terms
"schemes" and ''trustee respondents" are sometimes used interchangeably, Le.63 percent
of trustee respondents refers to five out ofeight equity-share schemes.
3.1 Establishment ofthe scheme
Sl'P reported that farmworkers do not participate in decisions around the financial and
legal arrangements of the farmworker equity-share schemes, do not join because they do
not understand how the workers' trust is supposed to work, that land reform and housing
'options are not fully explained, and that there are problems with the assessment of farm
value and the financial viability of schemes. The 200 I study ' showed that in the majority
ofcases (seven of the eight schemes) the process ofestablishing an equity-share scheme
involved in-depth workshopping with prospective beneficiaries to select an appropriate
legal entity, to define the rules of their association and to discuss the scheme 's structure .
3 Unless otherwise stated, all references to data relate to the 2001 study. To preserve confidentiality the
names of people interviewed and the names of the farmworker equity-share schemes studied are not
disclosed.
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At three of the eight schemes the potential beneficiaries, represented by a steering
committee, had visited other schemes to speak to worker-shareholders or had invited
them to workshops to share and learn from their experiences. At one scheme the workers
had engaged the services of an accountant to help them understand the financial
implications ofthe project and to advise them accordingly.
The SPP report stated that workers do not participate as shareholders because they do not
understand how the workers' trust is supposed to operate . To examine this concern the
2001 study tested respondents ' knowledge and understand ing ofthree dimensions oftheir
scheme and workers' trust, namely; profit sharing, election procedures, and property
rights including the tradability of shares. Although interviews were conducted with
trustees and not with ordinary worker-shareholders, all ofthe respondents showed a clear
understanding of how their scheme and the workers ' trust operated, and were able to
answer virtually all ofthe questions posed to them on issues relating to these dimensions.
Moreover, the respondents were - without exception - enthusiastic about participating in
the farmworker equity-share scheme. At seven ofthe eight schemes all of the permanent
farmworkers had voluntarily become shareholders. At the remaining farm, six recently
employed workers were not part of the scheme but had applied for LRAD grants to
enable them to join once the grants were approved. Some of the trustees interviewed
stated that workers on neighbouring farms were often jealous ofthem being part ofsuch a
project and expressed the hope that they too may have a similar opportunity in the future.
The SPP reported problems with the assessment offarm net asset value and the financial
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viability of some schemes. Six of the eight schemes in the 200 I study were eo-
financed by a private lender or by NewFarmers Development Company (an equity
investor) and all eight projects had received DLA grant funding (Table 1). The presence
of private finance indicates that a thorough financial analysis found the project to be
creditworthy as private lenders and investors bear risk. In addition, to obtain DLA grant
funding, the business plan for the prospective equity-share project must also include a
financial analysis of the farm. This covers the farm 's financial records for the past five
years, an analysis ofthe farm's strengths and weaknesses, and projections offarm income
and costs over the next five years. The aim ofthe DLA appraisal is generally two-fold: to
establish whether the purchase of equity in the farm presents a sound investment for the
workers, and secondly to aid the DLA in their task ofallocating scarce fiscal resources to
beneficiaries that are able to deploy these resources profitably in the long term. Even so,
farmworker equity-share schem es eo-financed by the private sector and the DLA are
more likely to succeed financially than are projects that attract only DLA funding
because private lenders and investors have a financial interest in the project's success. To
address concerns about the assessment of net asset value and the financial viability it
seems prudent to suggest that DLA grant funding should not be awarded to a farmworker




In the SPP's 1998 study, beneficiaries stated that there had been little change in working
conditions, wages, tenure security or job security, and that they were disappointed in the
lack oftangible benefits. The 2001 study questioned beneficiaries on similar issues. Most
ofthe trustee respondents (88 per cent) felt that they could improve working conditions if
they chose to (and perceived this as one of the farmworker equity-share schemes
benefits) and had been successful in both cases where they had tried to do this. They were
also confident that they could influence wage levels, but most accepted that this would
not be wise until the project was making enough money to justify higher wages.
Knowledge of the farm's financial status made workers aware that demands for wage
increases could jeopardise their own investment in the long-term.
Trustees were asked what benefits, expected or unexpected, the equity-share scheme had
provided. The most common benefits cited were improved housing and free transport (for
example, to town once a week or to a clinic). Other benefits cited included free or
subsidized creches, schooling and clinics . It seems that project managers are aware ofthe
workers' need for tangible benefits , especiall y when dividends have yet to be declared.
Although one scheme was in a position to declare dividend s in 2001, the workers chose
to invest these earnings in a new packshed. Considering their low incomes, this
willingness to forgo current earnings suggests that the workers understand the project and
have confidence in management. With the exception of one scheme , beneficiaries were
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pleased with the progress ofthe project and satisfied with the benefits it had provided.
In a follow-up interview with the SPP, Mason (2001) continued to express the view that
farmworker equity-share schemes favour the original owner excessively and do not
provide meaningful benefits for worker-shareholders. However, the 200 I study suggests
that this may not be the case.
3.3 Power relations
Power relations between management and worker-shareholders had not changed on the
projects examined by the SPP in 1998. In particular, workers' shareholding was not
representative oftheir say in decision-making. Workers claimed that they were unable to
influence financial or operational decisions and stated that there was a distinct lack of
communication between management and worker-shareholders, especially with regard to
financial reporting. In the 200 I study, trustees interviewed at seven projects felt that their
say in the business was proportional to their shareholding, while those from the
remaining project felt that their say was more than proportional! At all but one scheme
these respondents believed that they could influence financial and operational decisions
to some extent. Three-quarters ofthe trustee respondents rated their part in the scheme 's
decision-making process as excellent or good, and a quarter rated it as average. The latter
group suggested that with further training they could play a greater role in this process .
All of the worker-shareholders had received training in the interpretation of financial
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statements at five ofthe eight schemes. At the three remaining projects the chairperson
of the workers' trust had received extensive training, enabling himlher to pass on
financial information to the other shareholders. At these projects only the chairperson had
received training due to high levels of illiteracy on the farm. Lack of communication
between management and worker-shareholders was not cited as a problem by any ofthe
respondents in the 2001 study. Worker-shareholders and management met, on average,
every two-three months.
3.4 Skills transfer
The transfer of skills should be a priority for all farmworker equity-share schemes. The
Sl'P report highlighted the need for literacy training and basic training in financial
matters for worker-shareholders to participate meaningfully in a project. This training
needs to be completed before embarking on more complex institutional and financial
training. On a positive note, the 2001 study found that all FWES beneficiaries had
received training in a range of issues, including all or some of the following;
identification of shareholders, shareholder rights and obligations, election and voting
procedures, distribution of benefits, interpretation of financial statements, general
business skills and life skills. At one scheme, where 40 per cent of beneficiaries were
illiterate, voluntary adult literacy courses had been underway for some time, with all
costs being covered by the company. Illiterate beneficiaries had expressed great interest
in learning to read and write, and almost all of them were attending the course. The SPP
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still maintains that the work experience ofthe average worker on a farmworker equity-
share scheme does not change, that workers do not receive meaningful skills transfer, and
that they do not benefit from capacity building (Mason, 200 I). Again the 200 I study
suggests otherwise.
3.5 Labour relations
As reported by Eckert et al. (1996: 20), one would expect the relationship between
management and labour to improve with the implementation of a farmworker equity-
share scheme due to factors such as changes in attitudes, feelings of empowerment and
stronger incentives for financial performance. However, the SPP reported that workers
felt that they were treated like children and had no say in the business. In the 2001 study,
trustees at six of the eight schemes stated that worker/management relations were
excellent. The others claimed that they were good or average. All of the trustee
respondents rated worker-shareholders' overall satisfaction with the scheme as either
. excellent or good. Three-quarters rated worker-shareholder participation in decision-
making as either excellent or good, and a quarter rated it as average. These favourable
labour relations are consistent with a priori expectations and reflect changing attitudes on
farms, especially on the part of the previous white owners who seem more willing to
view themselves as partners in a business rather than employers and farm managers.
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3.6 The position ofnon-beneficiaries
The SPP argued that non-participants who are permanent workers on the farm should not
be excluded from the benefits of the fannworker equity-share scheme. However,
spreading benefits across workers who do not wish to participate would entrench free-
riding and weaken incentives to invest in the project. In the 2001 study, all permanent
workers were either beneficiaries or were in the process ofbecoming beneficiaries. At all
eight schemes farm managers said that new workers on the farm would be actively
encouraged and given assistance to become shareholders ifthey wished to do so. On one
scheme management felt that the seasonal workers on the farm, many of whom return
every year, should be involved in the scheme in some way.
3.7 Gender relations
The SPP report indicated that women did not participate as equals in the equity-share
schemes studied. Women were excluded from many of the farm's more strenuous (and
thus higher-paying) activities due to the work being too physically challenging; they were
paid lower wages as they held less skilled positions; where DLA grants had been issued ,
the man of the household felt that he "held" the share; and, in general, women did not
participate in committee meetings. In summary , the SPP study concluded that women did
not have equal status to men, and had not been empowered by the fannworker equity-
share scheme. The results ofthis study are far more positive. On 63 per cent of the FWES
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more than 50 per cent of the worker-shareholders are women and these women are
shareholders in their own names. Furthermore, in seven out ofeight cases, the trust-deed
makes special provision for female trustees.
The discrepancy between wage levels of male and female shareholders on farmworker
equity-share schemes is still , however, evident. Wages paid to men and women were
equal at only two of the case studies. Men earned higher salaries on the other six. Farm
managers attributed this to the fact that female workers generally have fewer skills. The
Employment Equity Bill states "every employer must take steps to promote equal
opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment
policy or practice". This clause is intended to provide male and female employees with
equal opportunities to improve their skills via training in the workplace. With greater
skills, differences in salaries between women and men on farmworker equity-share
schemes should diminish.
3.8 Tenure security
Tenure security did not seem to be a controversial issue amongst shareholders in the SPP
study. Likewise, in the 2001 study, 50 per cent of trustee respondents did not rate tenure
security as either the first or second most important benefit of the equity-share project. It
is the view of the SPP (Mason , 2001) that all farmworker equity-share schemes should
provide separate housing for worker-shareholders to protect them against losing both
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their jobs and homes if the scheme fails. The SPP feels that separate housing is a
necessary requirement to protect beneficiaries of DLA land grants. However, providing
housing that is not tied to employment could result in a proliferation of unemployed
people residing on or near the project. Many district councils in the Western Cape are
opposed to the possibility of villages being created on farms as they find the servicing of
these small rural settlements problematic. In some instances, e.g. the high profile Fair
Valley case, the district council has refused permission to sub-divide farmland for
residential use despite legal action instituted by the land reform beneficiaries.
Furthermore, in the Western Cape, many farms are held by family trusts that specifically
prohibit the subdivision ofland.
On four of the eight farmworker equity-share schemes studied in 2001 , workers lived in
nearby towns or farms. At the remaining four schemes, workers' tenure security is only
as secure as their job. Ifworkers leave voluntarily or involuntarily their residential rights
. are governed by the Labour Relations Act, Act 66 of 115, by the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) and by the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act, Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA). At one scheme, the workers ' trust has negotiated a deal that
will give each beneficiary a 99-year lease on their house , whether or not they are
employed by, or retain shares in, the equity-share scheme (houses are currently under
construction on the farm).
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3.9 Issues ofentry and exit
The SPP did not criticise entry and exit issues within fannworker equity-share schemes.
However, the 2001 study highlighted some issues in this area that could become
problems in the future. For example, shares can be bequeathed to outsiders at three ofthe
case studies. In future years this may pose a problem. One of the fundamentals
underpinning a farmworker equity-share scheme is that workers have an incentive to
invest time and effort in the farm as they share in its profits and capital gains. This
incentive will be diluted when shares transfer to non-empl oyees. For this reason worker-
shareholders at the other five schemes may not bequeath shares to outsiders.. Shares are
sold back to the workers ' trust at their audited market value when a worker exits the
scheme, with the proceeds accruing to the worker or his/her estate. Entry conditions were
detailed in the workers ' trust-deed at most of the farmworker equity-share schemes
studied in 2001. For example, at one project , new recruits face a probation period and
then must apply to - and be accepted by - the workers' trust to become a shareholder. If
the worker's application is approved, he or she may then apply for an LRAD grant. It
generally takes a period of up to three years for a new worker to become a shareholder.
Provisions for voluntary and involuntary exit are well defined in shareholders '
agreements for all eight of the case studies. Worker-shareholders were free to exit at any
time at all of the schemes studied . However, seven of the projects imposed a five-year
moratorium on the sale of shares, and the remaining project a three-year moratorium.
While shareholders may leave the scheme at any time they cannot sell their shares until
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the moratorium is over. A temporary restriction on share transactions involves a trade-
off. In theory, it dampens shareholder incentives to invest. In practice, it improves
creditworthiness by "locking in" the managerial experience ofthe previous owner during
the critical early stages 0 f a scheme 's life.
3.10 Other concerns
Fast's 1999 report for the SPP contended that farrnworker equity-share schemes are
management intensive operations and poor management decisions may therefore
jeopardise the whole project. Whilst this is true of any project, the thorough analysis of
creditworthiness performed by private lenders and investors - combined with the DLA
screening process - reduces the likelihood ofpoor management. The SPP (Mason, 200 I)
feels that farmworker equity-share schemes are only an "investment option" and are not a
way of empowering previously disadvantaged individuals or of redistributing land.
However, equity-sharing redistributes wealth as opposed to just land, and has the
advantage of retaining or attracting the quality management needed to attract capital and
to make full use of scarce resources. Table I (see page 31) shows the redistribution of
wealth that occurred within the eight equity-share schemes studied in 200 I. In total
R6,781,743 transferred to the farmworker-shareholders in these schemes.
Unlike many other land reform projects, farmworker equity-share schemes offer
beneficiaries and taxpayers a potentially favourable return on their investment and an
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opportunity for beneficiaries to realise the value of that investment. Indeed equity-
share schemes have the potential to be a great improvement on many other land reform
projects in South Africa, particularly the group settlement projects that emerged under the
settlement/land acquisition grant programme. These projects involved large groups of
beneficiaries pooling their settlement/land acquisition grants to purchase whole
commercial farms. The group established a legal entity, usually a community land trust or
a communal property association that became the "private" owner of the property.
Inadequate support ofthese beneficiary groups resulted in weak institutions.
Pitout et al. (1998: 29-53) conducted case studies of selected CLT's showing poor
accountability of executive members, collapse of the electoral process, and non-
compliance with managerial decisions. Furthermore, these projects have not empowered
women or met gender goals. In a study of settlement/land acquisition grant funded
projects, Walker (2002) noted that although trust committees often included some
women, there was no explicit mechanism in the trust-deed to ensure that women continue
to be elected as trustees in the future. According to the National Land Committee (NLC),
only 14 per cent of beneficiaries listed under the settlement/land acquisition grant
programme (up until August 2000) were female (Turner and Ibsen, 2000: 12). This
contrasts with the 2001 farmworker equity-share scheme case studies where the majority
of shareholders were women at most schemes. Lyne and Graham (2001) present
empirical evidence in support of their argument that settlement/landacquisition grant .
projects converted commercial farms intoopen access resources. As a result , the land has
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no market or collateral value, nor are there incentives for allocative efficiency, rent
maximization, or the conservation and improvement ofresources (pitout et al., 1998: 49).
A further concern raised by the SPP are the delays involved in the DLA process, i.e. the
time taken for the grant to be approved and paid out; insufficient follow-up once grants
have been disbursed and inadequate assessment ofproposed projects. When questioned
about this, the DLA (Middleton, 200 I) said that it would not be possible to conduct a
more rigorous scrutiny of proposals and accelerate the grant allocation process as these
represent two conflicting objectives. The process ofallocating grants is a slow one as the
DLA is applying more vigorous screening procedures to prevent situations where grants
are used to prop-up highly indebted farms. However, if as suggested previously, DLA
grants are only made available to those projects eo-financed by private lenders or
investors, the need for the DLA to conduct its own financial analyses could be
eliminated. Instead, the DLA could focus its attention on the outreach and empowerment
aspects ofproposed land reform projects.
The findings of the 200 I study suggest that the evaluation of proposed farmworker
equity-share schemes should include an analysis of labour relations on the farm by
questioning long-serving workers. During the interviews it became apparent that an
atmosphere oftrust between workers and management is a prerequisite for any successful
equity-share scheme.
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The two studies compared in this chapter differ in their findings, with those from the
SPP's study being largely negative and those from the 2001 study being largely positive.
A number of factors might account for these differing results . All of the case studies
conducted in 2001 were located in the Western Cape, whereas the SPP split their cases
equally between the Western Cape and Mpumalanga provinces. Beneficiaries in the
Western Cape are predominantly "coloured" people, while those from Mpumalanga are
largely black. Most coloured farmworkers use the same home language as their
employers (Afrikaans) and some understand English. For black farmworkers,
communication with white farmers, government officials, lenders, planners and legal
advisers is far more difficult. Communication problems are not conducive to an
environment of mutual trust and raise the (transaction) costs of negotiating and
implementing the institutional changes required for a successful farmworker equity-share
scheme. The 200 I study was also more comprehensive in that eight farmworker equity-
share schemes were studied. These case studies were not selected according to their
financial health or apparent success. In comparison, only four farmworker equity-share
schemes were studied by the SPP and one of these four projects was purposefully
selected because it had run into financial problems.
Moreover, the SPP study was conducted three years prior to the 200 I study. During this
time many new farmworker equity-share schemes emerged , enabling prospective
shareholders to learn from the mistakes of existing projects and establishing equity
sharing as a viable mode ofland reform. The 200] study suggests that many ofthe SPP's
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concerns had been addressed in more recent projects. These relate to beneficiaries'
participation and expectations, power relations between management and worker-
shareholders, skills transfer and labour relations. However, some areas of concern still
remain, namely, beneficiaries ' tenure security , different skill and wage levels between
men and women, literacy amongst all worker-shareholders, and exit procedures.
The following chapter examines inter-relationships between institutional arrangements,
quality of management, worker empowerment and the performance of the nine
farmworker joint ventures used as case studies. The discussion shows how variables




INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF
FARMWORKEREQUITY-SHARE SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA:
IDENTIFYING BEST INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES
This chapter aims to identify the institutional characteristics of successful FWES using
the principles of New Institutional Economics theory outlined in section 2.2 and data
gathered from all nine of the case studies (including the Fair Valley project which is not
an equity-sharing scheme) described in chapter I, and then to propose a set of "best
institutional practices" that is likely to promote the success offuture farmworker equity-
share schemes. Data relating to institutional arrangements and management quality;
worker empowerment and financial performance collected during the study are analysed
_ . ' 4
using cluster ana!?,sis. This technique was perfoll11e.? on variables to test for positive
relationships hypothesized in section 2.2 between indicators of enterprise performance
and sound institutional arrangements . For example, it was hypothesized that a scheme's
creditworthiness is positively related to a shareholder agreement that protects against a
sudden loss ofmanagerial expertise. -,
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of all nine case studies including the joint
venture that did not involve equity-sharing. For this reason, and for the sake of
anonymity, the case studies are referred to as "projects".
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4.1 Variables recorded in the case studies
Table 3 defines the set of observable variables chosen to represent the enterprise-level
r·/ ~\ 1 ' .'
constructs presented in Figure 14 (section ?.2). Some of the variables were continuous
but most were binary, scoring one or zero to indicate the presence or absence of an
attribute. To accommodate the cluster analysis presented in Section 5, all ofthe variables
were standardized as dummies scoring one for the presence (absence) of a desirable
(undesirable) attribute, and zero otherwise so that the expected relationships between
institutional arrangements and performance indicators are positive. Decisions regarding
the desirability of these attributes were informed by the NIE literature, specifically that
relating to the emergence ofnew generation cooperatives.
4.2 Empirical model
4-1
The theoretical model postulated in Figure 14 was collapsed into a more tractable
r'?~:~ (; ~';l...- .
empirical model (Figu re 15) because its constructs were not all uniquel y observable. The
empirical model in Figure 15 argues that the institutional arrangements within a FWES
have both a direct and an indirect effect on enterprise performance through worker
empowerment and retention of competent management. In turn, the institutional
arrangements are influenced by the qu ality of management. For example, in the first case
study (project I) the operating entity is registered as a trust and is therefore not obliged to
make provision for an annual external audit ofthe enterprise. Nevertheless, management
Table 3: Indicator variables observed in the case studies
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r-Variable * Definition of variables Empirical
construct
--
dividend Has the enterprise been in a position to declare dividends?
capgains
Havethere been any realised or unrealised capital gains in the valueof sharesor assets
since the enterprise was initiated?
wages
Is the lowest wageearnedby a skilled worker-shareholderabove the averageforthe case
studies?
pvtfin Has a private sectorlenderor investorprovided finance for the enterprise?
collateral Has a commercial bank accepted the enterprise' s assets as collateral for a longterm loan?
profits
Have worker-shareholders received dividend incomeor realised capital gains in share or Performance
assetvalues?
Have worker-shareholders gainedthe benefits of beingableto influencewagesor working
indicators
conditions
conditions and/ordo they feel that their tenure or employment security has increased?---
Haveworker-shareholders benefited by receiving improved housing or moresecure
housing residential rights?-_.__ .
enterprise Have the worker-shareholders establishedtheirown business enterprise/s on the farm?
empower
Do the worker-shareholders feel that the project has empowered them? Werethey positive
about the project and its impacton their lives?
zrounslzc Is the sizeofthc worker-shareholder croup below the median across the projects?
ic ... - company Is the enterprise operated as a company?
decpower
Do worker-shareholders feelthat the power they exercise in policy decisionsis at least
equal to their shareof equitv in the business?
noheirs Sharescannot be bequeathed to multiple heirs.
noout Sharescannot be bequeathed to outsiders.
Institutional
I
Exit · Shareholders must sell their shares if they exit the proiect.
nroovote Do shareholdersreceive nrooortionallv more votes as their shareholding increases?
arrangements
propprof Do shareholders receive proportionally moreprofitas their shareholding increases?
nolimit There is no limiton the numberof shares held by a worker-shareholder.




eauitv Is the worker-shareholders' equityshare abovethe average for allcasestudies?
skillsl Have the worker-shareholdersreceived trainingin basic life skills such as family planning,
budgeting, dealing with alcoholismand domesticviolence?
skillsg Has a generaltransferof technicalskills taken placeand was this trainingperceived to be at~ , leastadequate?
skillsf Have worker-shareholders, or at leasttheir trustees, received training enablingthem to readand interpret financial statements relating to the project?
WorkerHave worker-shareholders, or at least their trustees, received training enablingthem to
....---<'" skillsm serveas officebearers in their trust and the operating company? empowerment
Ipartest Did worker-shareholders participate in the establishment ofthe project through attendingworkshops, discussiongroups, visiting existingFWES etc?
~
partdm Do worker-shareholders participate in decisions relatingto the project' s operation (e.g.----; decisions regardingthe expansion or diversification of the enterprise)?
.- femtrust : Weresoecial provisions madeto ensure that at least50% of the workertrustees are female?
mgtqual Wasthe quality of managementratedas goodor excellent by worker-shareholders in terms
of its technicalability to makewise investment decisions?
Iabrel Do workersratemanagement and labourrelations as goodor excellent?
busnlan Does the enterprise have a long-term business plan that managementis implementing?
resolve Arc'-formal disputeresolution procedures in place?
Managementextaudit Are financial statements subiectto annual externalauditing?
Are there provisions to extendthe percentage of sharesowned byworker-shareholders in a qualityfuture
predictablewayto makethem largerowners in the future?
incentives Is there a sal~centive schemeof worker-shareholders? I
Notes. * For all variab les, Yes - 1, No - O. Miss ing values are coded as-I.
Some variables (Table 3) could belong to mor e than one group. For example, a formal procedure to resolve
disputes cou ld be cons idered an institutional arrangement as well a" an indicator ofmanagement quality.
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opted for external audits thereby revealing its willingness to promote good corporate
governance.
Good managers are also expected to be more proactive in transferring skills to empower
worker-shareholders. For example, the manager ofproject 7 encouraged two semi-skilled
employees to purchase tractors with loans secured by the operating company. These
worker-shareholders now manage their own businesses, hiring out tractor services to the
FWES and to other clients. At projects 3 and 4, management had introduced training
courses in general life skills such as family planning, budgeting, dealing with alcoholism
and overcoming domestic violence. This training, which goes beyond the usual offerings
in technical, financial and leadership subjects associated with good governance, was
given much ofthe credit for an unusually strong work ethic amongst worker-shareholders









Figure 15: Empirical constructs ofa farmworker equity-share scheme
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Ten of the variables presented in Table 3 were selected as indicators of project
performance measured in terms of both the financial health of the enterprise and the
benefits passed onto its workers. These variables are dividend, capgains, wages, pvtfin,
collateral, enterprise, profits, conditions, housing and empower. Unfortunately, almost
all of the projects studied were either too new to have reported a full set of financial
records or their managers were unwilling to disclose this information. For this reason, the
measurement of enterprise financial health was limited to the variables diVidend:'
\
capgains, wages, pvtfin and collateral and had to exclude other conventional
measurements ofearnings or financial health, e.g. net profits or rate of return on assets or
equity. The variables pvtfin and collateral reflect the creditworthiness ofthe enterprise in
the eyes ofprivate sector lenders and investors, while wages indicates its liquidity status,
i.e. its ability to pay wages higher than the average paid to skilled workers across all nine
case studies. Likewise, the variables dividend and capgains reveal the ability of the
business to reward shareholders. From the workers' perspective, performance is
measured by the remaining five variables (enterprise, profits, conditions, housing and
empower); the three variables profits, conditions and housing measure three different. .
types ofbenefits that the enterprise has provided to worker-shareholders, while empower
and enterprise represent benefits in terms of their perceived ability to improve quality of
life and actual attempts to do so by initiating their own enterprises on the farm.
I
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4.3 Cluster analysis ofvariables
In this study, hypothesized relationships between the observable variables are analysed
using hierarchical cluster analysis, primarily because the sample size is small. The basic
aim of cluster analysis is to find the "natural groupings", if any, of a set of individuals
(cases or variables). In short, it aims "to allocate a set ofindividuals to a set ofmutually
exclusive, exhaustive, groups such that the individuals within a group are similar to one
another while individuals in a different group are dissimilar" (Chatfield and Collins,
1980: 2 I2). Cluster analysis measures the similarity (or dissimilarity) of every pair of
individuals. The basic data for cluster analysis describe a set ofN individuals on which p
measurements (variables or cases) have been recorded. The initial choice of a particular
set of measurements used to describe each individual constitutes a frame of reference
'within which to establish the clusters, and the choice reflects the investigators' judgment
of their relevance for the purpose ofclassification (Everitt, 1980). In this study a set ofN
= 35 variables (Table 3) was selected for analysis across p = 9 (relevant) case studies:
The specific aim of the analysis was to test for positive relationships between variables
representing the four empirical constructs by observing their natural groupings estimated
by minimizing the squared Euclidian distance within groups (clusters).
The conceptual model in Figure 14 and empirical model in Figure 15 imply that natural
groupings should contain a healthy mix of variables drawn from each of the four
empirical constructs because positive relationships are expected between sound
",
.;
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institutional arrangements, competent management, effective worker empowerment
and good enterprise performance. In other words, the natural groupings should not
coincide with the empirical constructs, as this would indicate the absence of strong
positive relationships between the empirical constructs.
4.4 Results
Cluster analysis revealed four distinct natural groupings or clusters. The mean Euclidean
distance within clusters increases markedly from 1.0 to 1.3 when the number ofclusters
diminishes from four to three, indicating a sudden loss of homogeneity within the groups
of variables when fewer than four clusters are retained. Table 4 shows the variables
contained within each of the four clusters and specifically the inter-relationship between
the empowerment, management and institutional variables on the one hand and the
performance indicators on the other. Importantly, the institutional variables appear in
every cluster reflecting the central role that good governance plays in promoting the
performance of a farmworker equity-share scheme. Positive correlations are strong for
variables within the same cluster and weaker for variables from different clusters.
Projects were then ranked (see Table 5) according to eight indicators of project
performance in Table 3 plus three additional indicators of human capital development
(skillsg, skillsl and skills! in clusters 1, 2 and 3 respectively) that were considered
important by worker-shareholders interviewed during the case studies. Some of the
71
projects did not report information for the performance indicators capgains and wages.
These two variables were therefore excluded from the ranking process to ensure that
projects were ranked only on (equally-weighted) indicators free of missing values. This
ranking process clearly distinguishes project 1 as the best performer and project 9 as the
worst performer.
The cluster analysis shows that variables measunng the four empirical constructs
(performance, empowerment, management and institut ional arrangements) of a FWES
are not independent of one another and combine readily with other indicators in each of
the natural groupings. Since variables within each of these natural groupings are
Table 4:
IVariables measuring worker empowerment
Variables measuring institutional arrangements
Variables measuring management quality
n
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positively correlated, key institutional variables can be selected from within each of
these clusters and related to specific elements of the four constructs in a bid to identify a
set of "best institutional practices". Key variables were taken as those important in
economic theory and free ofmissing values. The following discuss ion also uses anecdotal
evidence and comparisons between projects (especially the extreme projects in Table 5)
to highlight best practices.
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Project 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10 1
Project 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 2
Projec t 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 6 3
Project 4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 6 3
Project 5 0 0 1 1 , 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 .
Project 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 5
Proiect 7 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 5 5
Project 8 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 5 5
Project 9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
Note: A complete database IS presented In Appendix 2.
4.4.1 Cluster 1
This small cluster indicates positive relationships between the institutional variable
company and four empowerment variables: skillsg, skillsm, equity and femtrust. No
73
performance indicators or management variables appear in this cluster - possibly
because the case studies were still too new for their training to have had an effect on
performance, Project 2, for example, was registered only 18 months before the case study
was conducted.
Cluster I suggests that projects operated as companies invest more in skills training and
~ ,..- -
are more gender sensitive than those operated as a partnership, trust or CPA. Projects
that invest less in skills training tend to be those where workers own a relatively small
share of the equity (e.g. projects 5 and 6) . Despite these differences, virtually all of the
project managers emphasised the importance of skills training, and expressed a need for
this training to be continuous and preceded by basic literacy training. Projects 1 and 8
both reported illiteracy rates in excess of 40 per cent amongst workers before they. .
became shareholders, but project I was the only case study that provided basic literacy
training.
The advantage ofoperating a FWES as a company is that the Companies Act, 61 of 1973,
provides the legal framework for transparency, accountability and well-defined,
proportional and tradable property rights. These same institutional characteristics could
also be written into the constitutions of other legal entities chosen to formalize the
business. Projects 6 and 9 are registered as a trust and a CPA respectively but neither
embraces the property rights or governance attributes ofa company, or the skills transfers
and proactive gender relations found in clu ster I .
74
4.4.2 Cluster 2
Cluster 2 identifies positive relationships between the four performance indicators
dividend, enterprise, empower and profits; one institutional variable decpower; one
management variable mgtqual; and two empowerment variables skillsl and partdm. The
l - . ~ - . ~_ ._- -- --
eo.v<\f1\ v.....
latter variable highlights the importance of sharing control;and not just ownership,ofthe
.. ......._..,."_ _ ,. , " . . \ . '. . "" " ' '''' ',
~.~_.-- ,..- .
enterprise with workers. Project I, the top ranked performer, recorded positive scores on
, ' " • I
all ofthe variables contained in cluster 2. The manager ofthis project had taken proactive
steps to,~~lp worker-shareholders exercise their decision-making rights, so strengthening
their incentive compatible employment contracts. These steps included training in life
skills (skills!), encouraging worker representatives to participate in business decisions
(partdm) and promoting workers' efforts to establish enterprises of their own
(enterprise) . In addition, the manager decided that a different worker-shareholder should
supervise the farm for one day each week in order to improve their awareness and
knowledge of business activities. The sense of empowerment (emp011;'er) expressed by
workers at project I, and the substance that this empowerment lends to worker incentives,
could well explain its positive showing on the performance indicators dividends and
profits. Project 6 did not score positively on either of the empowerment variables.
Worker-shareholders received little training at this project and their representatives
complained that they were unable to participate fully in board meetings or raise matters
ofconcern to workers because management did not give them sufficient time to consider
and extend the agenda. Not surprisingly, the workers did not rate management as having
outstanding ability, nor did they feel empowered. Project 6 recorded no benefits in terms
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ofdividends or capital gains.
4.4.3 Cluster 3
This cluster shows that there is positive correlation between the performance indicators
housing, capgains and conditions; empowerment variables skills! and partest;
management variables labrel, extaudit, busplan , resolve, and incentives; and the
institutional variables propvote, propprof, nolimit and noheirs. The institutional variables
__ -- --.-;.N..__.. ._ ..__......--......
all indicate a focus on maintaining incentives for worker-shareholders to invest more
effort and money into the project. Propvote, propprof are attributes typical of most
,.- ......_. , , ' . -"'-_"" " '"-'~' ~-'~'....~~- -- . ,-,.
investor owned firms where voting and benefit rights are proportional to the equity
invested by individual members. As explained in section 2, these property rights help to
address the free-rider, horizon, portfolio and control problems that tend to undermine
cooperative ventures. Ideally there should be no restrictions on the quantity of equity
shares voluntarily purchased by investors. Ostensibly this condition (nolimit) was
satisfied in all of the case studies except project 9, but in reality it applied only to worker-
shareholders owing to strong expectations (sometimes formalised in business plans) that
previous owners would ultimately sell shares to workers rather than buy them out. In
addition, most of the projects imposed restrictions on the bequest of shares to multiple
heirs (noheirs) in order to reduce the threat offree-riding by non-employees.
Cluster 3 highlights positive association between good institutions and management









(labrel, resolve, and incentives) and financial transparency (extaudit). Good
management may also explain the presence ofempowerment variables within this cluster.
Partest suggests that workers understand their rights and obligations as they participated
in the establishment ofthe project, while skillsfshows that their training was extended to
cover its financial requirements. Together, these elements of the institutional,
management and empowerment constructs are positively related to performance
indicators, particularly worker benefits (housing, conditions and capgains) flowing from
longer-term investment. Workers at project 3 were particularly pleased to have rules
against "smoke breaks" overturned.
All ofthe case studies had favourable scores on most ofthe variables contained by cluster
3, projects I and 3 in particular. This consistency might indicate a healthy trend in
combining social and commercial objectives in land reform projects eo-financed with
public grants (as is the case for all nine projects) .
4.4.4 Cluster 4
In cluster 4 there is positive correlation between the performance indicators wages,
collateral and pvtfin; the institutional variables moratorium, noout, exit and grpsize; and
the management variable future . Positive correlatio ns between the institutional variables
and these performance indicators may indicate financiers ' preference for projects that are
more liquid (wages) and which maintain worker incentives by preventing the transfer of
shares to non-employees (moratorium, noout and exit).
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All ofthe case studies imposed a moratorium ofeither three or five years on the sale of
shares by the previous owner and employees. While appreciating that even a temporary
moratorium could discourage member investment, a new equity-share project is unlikely
to be considered creditworthy by lenders unless its equity and the previous owner's
managerial expertise are "locked in" during the early, critical years of its life. Ofcourse,
it is also unlikely that a moratorium will have much bearing on creditworthiness in
projects where workers initially take up a large share of the total equity . For example,
projects 1 and 3 both imposed a five-year ban on the sale of shares, but project 3 with its
much larger worker-shareholding (49 per cent) has not attracted loan finance (pvtfin).
Projects possessing the management attribute future are also more attractive to private
financiers as they can expect a gradual (rather than a sudden) transfer of ownership to
workers over a period of time long enough to allow for adequate training and mentoring
in decision-making skills. Project 5, for example, has a very specific plan to reduce the
previous owner's shareholding relative to that of workers as the need for mentoring
diminishes.
A further advantage to private lenders and investors in dealing with the previous owner as
the majority shareholder is that the influence problem (Hendrikse and Veennan, 2001) is
reduced. This may explain the presence of grpsize in the cluster as external financiers
could find it difficult to influence policy decisions taken by directors representing large
groups ofworkers with diverse interests in the project. For example , project 8 - which has
no external finance - has a large worker shareholding and a large number of worker-
shareholders relative to the other projects.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study suggests that many of the Surplus Peoples Project's concerns regarding
farmworker equity-share schemes have been addressed in more recent projects. These
relate to beneficiaries' participation and expectations, power relations between
management and worker-shareholders, skills transfer and labour relations. However,
some areas of concern still remain, namely, beneficiaries ' tenure security, different skill
and wage levels between men and women, literacy amongst worker-shareholders, and
exit procedures. While it appears that progress has been made in the design and
implementation ofequity-share schemes since the SPP report, this conclusion may not be
valid for two main reasons. First, it is possible that the worker representatives (trustees)
who were interviewed might be more optimi stic about the performance of their projects
than the worker-shareholders. Second , this study did not present sufficient evidence of
financial performance to corroborate the views of worker representatives and project
managers.
The results of the cluster analysis lend support to the positive relationships postulated
between sound institutional arrangements, effective worker empowerment,competent
management and the successful performance of a farmworker equity-share scheme.
Elements of these four constructs combined readily with each other in four natural
groupings (clusters) of 35 variables measured across nine case studies ' of farmworker
joint ventures in the Western Cape. Even so, trends were apparent within the clusters .
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The first cluster contains only five variables , of which four are positive indicators of
worker empowerment through skills transfer, gender sensitivity and share of equity
owned in the enterprise. The second cluster is dominated by performance variables
(relating primarily to enterprise profitability) and empowerment variables indicating a
transfer of life skills to workers and active participation of their representatives in
business decisions. Cluster 3 links measures of management quality (like competence in
financial planning, labour relations and salary incentive schemes) to performance
indicators such as improved housing and working conditions.
The fourth and last cluster is dominated by institutional variables and performance
variables, both related to creditworthiness. In particular, cluster 4 emphasises institutional
arrangements that maintain worker incentives by preventing shares from transferring to
non-workers, and which preserve creditworthiness by preventing a sudden transfer of
control to inexperienced owners.
Most importantly, the institutional variables occur in every cluster and gather in a way
that reveals best practices. Cluster 3 includes property rights designed to eliminate free-
and forced-rider problems in collective action, i.e. tradable voting and benefit rights
assigned to participants in proportion to their individual investment. Cluster 4 highlights
a trade-off between the ideal of fully transferable shares and restrictions on certain
transfers to prevent free-riding by non-workers, or the loss of creditworthiness through
sudden outflows of equity and managerial expertise. Cluster I favours the use of a
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company (rather than other legal entities) to empower workers participating in equity-
share schemes. In South Africa, companies offer well-defined property rights,
accommodate restrictions on share mobility, and entrench legal requirements for
transparent and accountable management. Cluster 2 emphasises the need to ensure that
farmworkers are able to exercise their property rights.
The cluster analysis undertaken in this research indicates that a successful farmworker
equity-share scheme should be operated as, or like, a company with voting and benefit
rights proportional to the investment made by each member, but with restrictions on
certain share transactions. These include:
•
•
Limits on the transfer of shares by employees to non-employees through sale or
bequest. The workers' trust usually buys shares from workers who leave a project,
disbursing the proceeds to the worker or, in the event ofdeath, his or her estate.
A temporary moratorium on the sale of shares (especially by the previous owner)
coupled with a long-term plan to effect a gradual reduction in the proportion of
equity held by the previous owner.
These institutional arrangements must further be accompanied by other best practices
such as worker participation in the design of the equity-share scheme and its operating
rules, provision for female representation in the workers' legal entity, and a general
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transfer ofbasic literacy, life and technical skills followed by continuous mentoring in
financial, administrative and managerial skills so that worker representatives can perform
their duties as office bearers , participate meaningfully in policy decisions, and ultimately
establish their own enterprises.
In addition to these empowerment practices, an equity-share scheme should entrench
financial transparency and accountability in all of its legal entities by appointing a
reputable external auditor and adhering to broadly accepted procedures for reporting,
conducting meetings and holding elections. These elements of good corporate
governance usually stem from competent management, as do the presence ofa long-term
business plan (especially one accepted by a commercial financier) , formal procedures for
resolving labour disputes and protecting minority interests, incentive schemes for good
performance, and a history ofgood labour relations.
A number ofpolicy recommendations can be made . First , it is recommended that LRAD
grants should be awarded only to beneficiaries of equity-share schemes that are eo-
financed by a private investor, commercial bank or other reputable institution as this
ensures thorough financial analysis. In addition this appro ach eliminates the need for a
separate financial analysis by the DLA and would therefore reduce the time taken for
grant approval - a process that has taken four years at one case study. Excessive delays in
grant disbursement hold up the empowerment process and damage the project's solvency
and liquidity.
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Second, it is recommended that the DLA should check the history oflabour relations
on the farms that apply for LRAD grants to establish equity-share projects. Objective
measures of mutual trust and respect might include a comparative analysis of recent
conditions of employment, skills training, average length of service, turnover in the
workforce and de facto practices for hearing and settling labour disputes.
Third, the DLA should consider extending its grants to regular but seasonal farmworkers
who wish to participate in established FWES. At present, only permanent employees are
eligible for grants.
Farmworker joint ventures and equity-share schemes in particular may never satisfy
everyone's view ofland reform, even when it is impractical to redistribute land to small
owner-operators. Nevertheless, recent experience suggests that well-designed equity-
share schemes represent a viable mode of redistributing wealth and de-racialising
. commercial agriculture in South Africa.
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SUMMARY
This study has two goals: First to identify the institutional and financial factors that
influence the success offarmworker joint ventures (in particular farmworker equity-share
schemes) using relevant theory from the body of New Institutional Economics and data
gathered from nine case studies ofexisting farmworker joint ventures. Second, based on
the factors identified, to determine what set ofbest institutional practices is most likely to
promote the success ofthese schemes.
In 1998 it was estimated that around 50 equity-share schemes had been initiated in South
Africa, mostly in the Western Cape wine and fruit producing areas where high land
prices, lack ofaccess to finance and markets, and lack ofmanagement and business skills
create barriers to the entry of new farmers. Data gathered from nine farmworker joint
ventures in 2001 were gathered to explo re relationships between their institutional
arrangements and their performance, management quality and worker empowerment. The
enterprises were selected to ensure variation across a number of known indicators, such
as use of external finance, size and gender composition of beneficiary group, relative
shareholdings of farm workers, and choice of legal entities and business organization.
The sample was designed to control, where possible, for non-institutional determinants of
financial performance such as enterprise type and geographic region. In-depth interviews
were conducted with the manager (frequently, the previous farm owner), worker trustees,
external financiers, local officials from the Department of Land Affairs, and the firms
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contracted to help with project planning, training and facilitation.
The purchase of land by a group of eo-owners can produce a range of tenure and
institutional arrangements. For example, the group may divide the land into separate
pieces with each individual exercising exclusive rights over his or her own piece ofland,
or they may share the land with each member having inclusive use rights, especially to
grazing land. Alternatively, the group may decide to become non-users and surrender
their use rights in favour of benefit rights, such as a share in the profits, and hire a
management team to operate the farm. It is also possible that a number ofthese strategies
may be used together, or that rules governing use or benefit rights are missing or not
enforced in which case the land becomes an open access resource. Each ofthese tenure
arrangements has its own economic implications.
A farmworker equity-share scheme is a corporate farming entity that may, or may not,
embrace the institutional arrangements needed to facilitate the profitable use ofresources
in land reform projects. A successful farmworker equity-share scheme should redistribute
wealth and future benefit streams, empower farmworkers through skills transfer and their
formal inclusion in policy making, retain or attract quality management, source capital
from the private sector to finance new investment, i.e. preserve or enhance
creditworthiness, improve worker productivity and labour relations, and provide for the
transfer of both ownership and control ofcommercial farms to previously disadvantaged
workers in the long-term.
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Achieving these goals requires a mix of institutional arrangements that make for good
corporate governance. First, joint farming ventures require decisive and accountable
management for financial performance. Second, these institutions should eliminate or
reduce the potential for free-rid ing to encourage investment by eo-owners. Third, it is
importantthat workers' interests in ajoint farming venture are not diluted by a transfer of
shares to non-workers as a result of bequests or sales to outsiders.
Perceptions of farmworker equity-share schemes appear to have improved. According to
a previous study conducted by the Surplus People 's Project, perceptions ofthese schemes
were largely negative. However, this study shows that many of the concerns had been
addressed in more recent projects. These relate to beneficiaries ' participation and
expectations, power relations between management and worker-shareholders, skills
transfer and labour relations. However, some areas of concern still remain , namely,
beneficiaries' tenure security, different skill and wage levels between men and women,
literacy amongst worker-shareholders, and exit procedures.
A cluster analysis of variables measuring four constructs of a successful farmworker
equity-share scheme, viz. sound institutional arrangements, effective worker
empowerment, competent management and good performance, revealed positive
. relationships between these constructs. Elements of these four constructs combined
readily with each other in four natural groupings (clusters) of 35 variables observed
across the nine case studies. Most importantly, the institutional variables occur in every
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cluster and gather in a way that reveals best practices.
The results of the study indicate that a successful farmworker joint venture should be
operated as, or like, a company with voting and benefit rights proportional to the .
investment made by each member, but with restrictions on certain share transactions.
These include, limits on the transfer of shares by employees to non-employees through
sale or bequest and a temporary moratorium on the sale of shares (especially by the
previous owner) coupled with a long-term plan to effect a gradual reduction in the
proportion of equity held by the previous owner.
These institutional arrangements must further be accompanied by other best practices
such as worker participation in the design of the joint venture and its operating rules .
provision for female representation in the workers ' legal entity , and a general transfer of
basic literacy, life and technical skills followed by continuous mentoring in financial ,
administrative and managerial skills so that worker representatives can perform their
duties as office bearers , participate meaningfully in policy decisions, and ultimately
establish their own enterprises.
In addition to these empowerment practices , joint ventu res with farmworkers should
entrench accountability. This is facilitated by transparency (for example, in reporting
externally audited financial statements) but is ultimatel y ensured by the mobility of
capital and a sound electoral process. These desirable features of corporate governance-
along with formal procedures to resolve disputes, performance-based remuneration
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packages for managers and workers, a long-term business plan and a history of good
labour relations - tend to manifest in projects that have competent managers.
A number of policy recommendations can be made. First, it is recommended that LRAD
grants should be awarded only to beneficiaries of projects that are eo-financed by a
private investor, commercial bank or other reputable institution to ensure a thorough
financial analysis of the project has been undertaken. Second, it is recommended that the
DLA should investigate the history of labour relations on the farms that apply for LRAD
grants to establish equity-share projects. Third, the DLA should consider extending its
grants to regular but seasonal farmworkers who wish to participate in established
farmworker equity-share schemes. At present, only permanent employees are eligible for
grants. Whilst farmworker equity-share schemes may never satisfy everyone's view of
land reform, recent experience suggests that well designed farmworker equity-share
schemes represent a viable mode of redistributing wealth and de-racialising commercial
agriculture in South Africa.
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APPENDIX 1: Case Study Questionnaire
23 rd October 2001
Dear Respondent,
RE: Questionnaire - Equity-sharing Projects
The objective ofthis study is to learn from existing equity-sharing projects and otherjoint
ventures with farm workers and disadvantaged communities by examining their financial
and institutional arrangements to aid the establishment of similar projects in KwaZulu-
Natal. This research is sponsored by USAID and is being conducted by the School of
Agricultural Sciences and Agribusiness, University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg.
Confidentiality is guaranteed and the anonymity of respondents is assured. The names of
projects that are used in this study will not be revealed in any published work and
participants will each receive a copy of publications emanating from the study.













Structure: Facilitator or financial institution
Managing director (MD): Questions 1-7
Questions 1, 2d, 3a, 3b, and 4: Chairman of Board ifnot answered by MD
Worker Trustee on Board of Directors (WTBD): Questions I, 3a, 3b, 5 and 2a, 2c, 2d,
3c ifnot answered by MD
Chair ofTrust: Questions 2b and 1,3a, 3b and 5 ifnot answered by WTBD
Question 7: DLA representative ifnot answered by MD
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Diagram of Ownership Structure (in terms of Companies, Trusts etc)
(Respondent: Facilitator or financial institution)
* All lease agreements between parties to be specified
Who decided on the current structure?
Did it differ from an earlier recommendation?
IYes INo IDon't Know
Ifyes, how and why?
Who made the earlier recommendation/plan?
--------------------









Is the Chairp erson a
shareholder? YINIDK*
Name ofManager
Is the manager a majority
shareho Ider? YINIDK*
No. ofdirectors/trustees
No. ofmale directors/ trustees
No. ofshareholders
No. ofshareholding directors
No. ofshareholding directo rs
with shares in Workers' Trust
(SDWT
Educational status ofSDWT: 1
r-
2
-=--- - - - - - - --t-- - - - - - - -
3
Farm experience ofworker f-:-l----------t----------J--- --I
directors/trustees Le. Position 2
held at time ofappointment r-::
3
- - - - - - - - - -t-- - - - - - - - -t-- - - - - - -'
*Y=Yes, N=No, DK=Don't Know
Breakdown ofsharehold ing - at time of establishment and now:
RatIO of ab solute terms (e.g. 2/5)
Shareholding Outside Previous Ow ner Worker's Trust Other (Specify)
Investors














2. The work force
(Respondent: MD or WTBD)
A. General



















. .. . . .












Black . \:, ..: ..-..'
Coloured
Other ". .: . : . .
*For example, pickers, packers etc
**For example, supervisors, drivers ctc
Who initiated the project?
Was participation as a shareholder voluntary?
Yes No IDon't Know I
Were facilitators contracted to implement the project?
I Yes No IDon't Know I
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Ifyes, which facilitators?
Who paid for the facilitators and what proportion ofcosts did they cover?









Were worker-shareholders instructed in any of the following subjects since the new
enterprise was first discussed with the workers?
Shareholders Quality of
received training training received
Determination ofrightful shareholders
Shareholder rights and obligations
Governance and voting procedures
Procedures for distributing benefits
Interpretation offinancial statements
*Other
1= yes 1= very good
2= no 2= good




What provisions were made to train worker-shareholders as office bearers in the Trust
(e.g. Trustees, treasurer) or Company(ies) (e.g. Directors)?
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Who paid for the training and what proportion oftraining costs did they cover?







From what sources did the workers finance their shares? (e.g. DLA grant, savings, loan)?





Did each worker-shareholder initially purchase the same quantity ofshares?
Yes No IDon't Know I
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What major benefits did the worker-shareholders anticipate from the equity-sharing
arrangement? Rank their importance. Which ofthese expected benefits have materialized
and how were they distributed?
Benefits Expected? Importance Distribution Method* if













* Benefits may have been distributed equally, by sernonty In the workforce, by size of
shareholding, etc.
Were there any unanticipated benefits for the worker-shareholders?
Were there any unanticipated drawbacks for worker-shareholders?
Have the Trustees added items to the agenda discussed by directors of the operating
company? Expand .
Are any ofthe current office bearers in the Trust or company women?
Yes No IDon't Know I
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Ifyes, what proportion are women?
----------
What was the most recent dividend per share held by the workers' Trust (Rands)? _
Can the Workers' Trust withhold part ofits dividend earnings from its own shareholders?
Yes No IDon't Know I
Ifyes, for what main purpose(s)?
1.
2.
If the workers ' Trust can withhold part of its dividend earnings from its own
shareholders, has this happened or been proposed yet and what was the reaction?




Please rate the following as perceived by the Workers' Trust:
Rating (1-5)*
Management - technical ability
Management - investment decisions
Management - worker/management relations
Worker-shareholder satisfaction with the project
Level ofworker-shareholder participation in decision-making
*1= excellent, 5= very poor
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C. Tenure security:
.(Respondent: MD or WTBD)
Land-holding Operating Trust Workers
Company Company (Number)








Ifworkers live on the farm, do not own the land on which they reside, but lease the
land:
Yes with authorization from the board
**Yes without authorization from the board
Yes * Yes ** No Don't Knowl
Uncertain
Can workers pledge




Can workers sell their
lease to another
worker?
Can the land be







with a piece oftheir
own land on which










What is the length ofthe contract/lease agreement (years)?------------




Small house (one room)
Larger house (more than one room)
Ifworkers live on land owned by a company, what happens to his or her residential rights
when he or she:
Resigns?·-----------------------------
Is (legitimately) fired or retrenched? ------------------
Dies?
D. Share Information:
(Respondent: MD or Chair ofBoard)
Operating Land-holding Trust
Company Company
Average value of shares acquired by
workers initially (Rand/worker)
Average no. of shares acquired by
workers initially (shares/worker)
Latest price assessment of worker
shares (Rand/share)
Length of moratorium on dividend
payment (months)
Length of moratorium on sale of
shares by workers (months)
Length of moratorium on sale of
shares by original owner (months)
Are there provisions for a gradual reduction in the previous owner's shareholding?
I Yes [Ny-] Don't Know I
Ifyes, please expand: -------- _
3.Institutional arrangements
A. Accountability and transparency




Yes No Don't Yes No Don't Yes No Don't
Know Know Know
Annual external auditing of
fmancial records
Audited statements &









(Respondent: MD/ Chair ofboard and WTBD/Chair ofTrust)
Operating
Corn an
Are the directors/Trustees elected by secret ballot?
Are the general meetings at which board
members/Trustees elected advertised to shareholders?





What is the minimum number ofshareholders required
for election ofboard members/Trustees?
What is the minimum number ofshareholders required
to convene an extraordinary meeting to contest a
decision taken by the Trustees?
Term ofoffice - directors (years)
Term ofoffice - Trustees (years)
Can directors serve more than 1 consecutive term?
Can Trustees serve more than 1 consecutive term?
Frequency ofTrustee/director meetings (months)
Can non-shareholders vote for directors/ Trustees?
Are candidates nominated in proportion to shareholding?
*Where relevant, record response as Yes/ No/ Don't Know (uncertain)
106
Were directors formally nominated and elected?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
Are the directors aware that they are collectively liable for taking decisions that are not in
the best interests ofthe company?
I Yes I No
Are the directors obliged to declare their personal shareholdings in, and transactions with ,
the company?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
Do any of the workers representatives in the company board (s) or Trust have previous
experience at this level ofbusiness administration?
I Yes I No [Qon't Know I
If yes, expand:
C. Proverty rights/ Tradability ofshares:
(Respondent: MD or WTBD/ Chair ofTrust)
Yes* * Yes*** No Don't
Know
Can shares be bequeathed to multiple heirs?
Can shares be bequeathed to outsiders? *
Can shares be sold at any time to another
permanent worker?
Can workers sell their shares at any time back
to the compan y?
Limit on No. / % ofshares held?
If a shareholder buys additional shares does
he/she acquire a greater share ofprofits?
*A person who does not work on the farm.
** Yes with authorization from the board
*** Yes without authorization from the board
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Are workers made aware ofchanges in the assessed value of shares?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
Ifyes, how? ---------------------------
What happens to a worker 's shares when he or she ex its the project?
Resigns (voluntary exit)? _
Is (legitimately) fired or is retrenched (involuntary exit)?
---------
Dies?
How can a new employee obtain shares in the scheme?
Ofthe benefits that have accrued to workers, what approximate p ercentage comes from thefollowing?





(Respondent: MD or Chair ofBoard ofoperating company)
Audited Statements - establish:
108
Nominal value of: At End of First At End ofLast Source(s) ofDebt
Financial Year* Financial Year*
Land and fixed
improvements (Rands)










Total interest paid on debt
(Rands)









(Respondents: MD and workers' representative on Board ofoperating company or Chair ofTrust)
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What were/are the three most Has the Ifyes, what action Arbitration Persons involved in settlin~
contentious issues that the problem been was taken? required? the dispute












Codes Describe problem 1= yes, fully Describe 1= yes Name




What procedures are followed to settle disputes?
6.Enterprise
(Respondent: MD)
Highest educational qualification: - - - -------- ---------------
Farming experience (years)
Typets) ofenterprise(s) and land area :
Contribution to Gross Income (%) Size ofenterprise in terms of
land area (hectares)
EnterpriseType At End of First At End of Last Before Company At End of Last
Financial Year Financial Year was registered Financial Year
What percentage of the operating company's gross income is earned from local sales
and what percentage is earned from export sales?
Local % --- - - ----- -
Export % _












What factors have adversely affected the economic prospects of this industry?
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Enterprise specific Regional Problems Policy, Industry and





Does the operating company have a long-term business plan?
I Yes I No IDon't Know I
If yes, how does the plan limit the business risk exposure ofshareholders?













Are there any special provisions to protect the investment made by worker
shareholders?
Is there an incentive scheme for the workers and the manager? Explain.
Workers:
Manager:
Do worker-shareholders receive any ofthe following (or other) benefits?
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Yes No Don 't Know Expand
Medical Aid contributions
made by company
Fully paid Vacation Leave
(days/annum) --






----- - ._.,-- - ... _.._ ._----_. _ -_.~~._-- ---_._-_..'_..-
j
Has the company pledged any of its assets to raise loan capital?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
If yes , what major assets has it encumbered?
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If loans were used to finance the workers' equity, were the loans made directly to
their trust, through the operating company or through the land-holding company?







Ifcommercial Banks made loans to finance the workers ' equity, who approached the
Bank and negotiated the tenus of the loan?
Level ofDecisions taken by Board and Manag er:
1. Is Board approval required to pledge land as security for a long-term loan?
Yes I No IDon't Know'
2. Is Board approval required to increase the line ofshort-term credit (e.g. the
overdraft facility) to finance seasonal inputs?
Yes I No IDon't Know I
3. What is the maximum payment the manager can make without eo-
authorization?
R----- - --
4. Can the manager enter into contracts with buyers and suppliers without Board
approval?
Yes I No J Don 't Know I
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7. Issues of importance to DLA
(Respondent: MD or DLA representative)
Was an application made to the DLA for grant funding?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
Did DLA reject an application for a pooled land grant to finance the project?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
If yes, why was the application rejected?
Were any of the individual workers listed in the application rejected?
I Yes I No IDon 't Know I
Was the original equity-sharing proposal modified in any way to secure a DLA grant
to finance the workers equity? Explain.
Did DLA provide a grant despite the presence ofcapital contributions from any other
lender or investor?
How long did it take to facilitate the project before shares were issued to workers?
Are there any special characteristics of the project that limit its replicability in other
enterprises or regions?
noheirs
APPENDIX 2: Data used in the cluster analysis
Project
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 678 9
busplan 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 -1
capgains 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 0
collateral 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
company 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
conditions 1 -1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
decpower 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 -1
dividend 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
empower 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
enterprise 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
equity 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
exit 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1
extaudit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1
femtrust 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
future 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1
grpsize 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
housing 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
incentives 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
labrel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1
mgtqual 1 11 1 1 0 1 1 -1
moratorium 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 -1
f---- - -- - -- --- -- - -- - - ---- f-- ------ ~----~
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 -1
nolimit
Notes: -1 - missmg value.
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